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The Introduction of a Private Wealth Module 
in CAPP_DYN: an Overview 
 
Carlo Mazzaferroa, Marcello Morcianob, Elena Pisanoc, Simone Tedeschid 
 
Abstract 
We  describe  and  discuss  the  integration  in  the  dynamic  micro simulation  model  CAPP_DYN  of  a  new 
module in which household’s savings and asset allocation are modelled. In particular, our efforts are addressed at 
accounting  for some  possible  behavioural  change  in  household  savings  within  a  framework  which  remains 
mainly  probabilistic.  To  this  end,  our  strategy  has  been  that  of  adopting  the  traditional  stochastic  micro 
simulation  approach  for  assets  allocation,  while  approximating  a  structural  framework  for  estimating 
consumption/saving  behaviour.  Our  framework  has  been  inspired  from  a  basic  version  of  the  life  cycle 
hypothesis as formulated in Ando and Nicoletti Altimari (2004). In fact, we emphasize the role of life cycle 
economic resources in households consumption decisions, yet we further modify their empirical model in order 
to account for internal habit formation and subjective expectations on pension outcomes in the econometric 
stage. Moreover, among the several probabilistic processes we introduce in the simulation program and present 
in  this  paper,  we  conceive  the  modelling  of  intergenerational  transfers  of  private  wealth  as  an  original 
contribution to the existing micro simulation literature. 
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1.  Introduction 
In micro simulation literature a limited number of models are provided with a module aimed at analyzing and 
projecting the evolution of private wealth along time5. Indeed, introducing a wealth module in a dynamic micro 
simulation model implies undoubtedly advantages, yet it entails some significant drawbacks. On the one hand, in 
fact,  the  modelling  of  wealth  permits  researchers  to  draw  a  more  complete  picture  of  disposable  income 
dynamics (i.e. labour plus capital income components) and of households' well being distribution, allowing also 
to analyze the future redistributive effects of reforms which are going to affect   as expected in Italy – both 
public and private pension pillars. On the other hand, however, it increases significantly the complexity of the 
model, explicitly arising the debated question of the choice between a mechanical and a behavioural approach.  
The traditional one, called also ‘probabilistic’, assumes relations estimated (through reduced forms) on data to 
be structurally stable over a period of about 50 years. To our knowledge, existing models – especially population 
based   including a wealth module have mainly relied on an arithmetical probabilistic approach, providing a 
deterministic representation of household decisions such as transmission, accumulation and decumulation of 
financial and real wealth, though enriched with several stochastic processes in order to account for heterogeneity 
and uncertainty in the dynamic simulation of all variables. In particular, some processes are modeled by means of 
reduced forms estimated on information from panel data surveys6   or administrative panel datasets matched 
with surveys7   sufficiently long to estimate steady relations for the accumulation and spend down of the main 
private assets, with no explicit modeling of household consumption decisions8 and mainly focusing on first 
round budgetary and distributional effects of possible policy change.  
Differently,  the  ‘structural  dynamic’  approach  models  economic  variables  as  a  solution  of  a  utility 
maximization problem subject to constraints given by the institutional framework or policy, trying to represent 
second round (behavioural) effects, which could either strengthen or offset the first order impact of reforms 
depending on the nature of responses. In this second scheme, a value function characterised by uncertainty in 
one  or  more  arguments  is  maximized,  and  the  solution  is  derived  by  backward  recursion  under  dynamic 
programming.  Therefore,  the  researcher  attempts  to  estimate  the  “deep”  underlying  preferences,  which  are 
assumed to be stable in the long run. However, in large scale dynamic cross sectional models the structural part 
(when does exist) does not involve all the simulated processes but, usually, integrates as an input, with many 
other probabilistic processes (see, for instance, Harris, Sabelhaus and Sevilla Sanz, 2005).  
                                                           
5 PENSIM2 in Great Britain, MINT3 in the United States or SESIM III in Sweden are some of the most relevant examples. 
6 FRS and BHPS for Pensim2, PSID and SIPP for MINT3. 
7 LINDA, the main source for SESIM, is an administrative dataset starting from 1960 which covers about 3.5% of Swedish 
population. 
8 Models based on surveys (PENSIM, MINT) estimate the unconditional probability for a household to hold a certain asset 
– and then the amount – at an age preceding retirement. Then they simulate the asset yearly evolution until household 
extinction . 
In SESIM, wealth is represented by means of a two part model as well; however, accumulation dynamics is simulated also at 
younger ages. A special effort in SESIM has been addressed in modeling a specific dynamics for private pension wealth 
(pension funds), starting from a reconstruction of accumulated tax deferred pension savings. 
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The reasons for this are manifold. First, dynamic micro simulation models do not explicitly allow for the 
supply side of the economy and therefore, at least so far, have not been tools for general equilibrium analyses 
(about  linking  CGE  and Microsimulation  models,  see  Peichl  2008).  Second,  a practical  limitation  with  this 
approach is that the estimation of an entirely structural modelling of the processes usually involved in a dynamic 
population  MSMs  would  imply  an  excessively  heavy  computational  burden  at  the  state  of  the  computer 
technology. 
Nevertheless, the introduction of some form of behavioral function is extremely important in models aimed at 
analyzing long run effects of radical reforms in the social protection system as long as these are expected to 
affect saving and labour supply decisions.  
The present work aims at developing and integrating the dynamic micro simulation model CAPP_DYN9 with 
a new module in which household’s savings and asset allocation are modelled. In particular, our efforts are 
addressed at accounting for some possible behavioural change in household savings within a framework which 
remains mainly probabilistic. To this end, our strategy has been that of adopting the traditional stochastic micro 
simulation approach for assets allocation (investments decisions), while approximating a structural framework 
for estimating consumption/saving behaviour. 
On the one hand in fact, consistently with the nature of CAPP_DYN, the wealth accumulation and spend 
down module allows the representation of several processes characterized by a high degree of institutional details 
by means of a large set of empirical ‘ad hoc’ solutions. On the other hand, since saving behaviour can be strongly 
affected by radical reforms, as the ones adopted in Italy, the traditional probabilistic approach based on reduced 
form estimations on current data would fail in representing long run relations, especially when reforms have not 
been fully phased in yet, due to a long transitional phase. In such cases, in order to account for the change in 
expectations and to give a proper account of household saving/consumption decision, the empirical model 
needs to be "clasped" to a theoretical framework.  
Our framework has been inspired from a basic version of the life cycle hypothesis as formulated in Ando and 
Nicoletti Altimari (2004) (AN henceforth) as most of their assumptions made in order to obtain a computable 
algebraic  expression  for  the  household  consumption  rule  as  well  as  several  of  their  enlightening  ‘heuristic’ 
solutions appeared reasonably compatible with the nature of our model. However, while AN aimed at carrying 
out a forecast for the evolution of aggregated saving, we are mainly interested in a long run distributional analysis 
of income, consumption and wealth, especially in the individual’s retirement period. 
In order to better represent behaviours and catch heterogeneity in a micro framework, we also allow for 
internal habit formation, as this hypothesis results particularly helpful in reconciling the life cycle theory with most 
of the empirical evidence on household inter temporal decisions (See, among others, Meghir and Weber, 1996; 
Seckin, 2000; Angelini, 2009). This approach assumes individuals/households derive utility not only from current 
consumption  but  also  from  the  comparison  with  a  reference  level  of  it,  which,  in  a  simplified  version,  is 
represented by previous period (lagged) consumption. As a result, this setting has the important implication that 
                                                           
9 For a description of the pre existing structure of CAPP_DYN, see Mazzaferro and Morciano (2009). 4 
 
agents  attempt  to  smooth  both  level  and  variation  in  consumption.  Therefore,  as  in  the  original  AN 
microsimulation  analysis,  we  emphasize  the  role  of  life  cycle  economic  resources  in  households 
consumption/saving  decision,  yet  we  further  modify  their  empirical  model  in  order  to  account  for  habit 
persistence and subjective expectations on pension outcomes in the econometric stage; in addition, we allow for 
liquidity constraints on consumption expenditure in the simulation program.  
In  the  next  section  we  briefly  outline  the stylized  functioning  of  the  Wealth Module,  by  illustrating  the 
sequencing of the main tasks i.e. transferring, investing, and allocating wealth among main assets. Then, in 
section 3, we describe the theoretical background for modelling the behaviour of households in distributing 
resources for consumption over the life cycle. In order to achieve this aim, we focus on the estimation of 
household lifetime human resources   and their specific components (section 3.1)   a key variable employed for 
the estimation of the consumption rule explained in section 4. In section 5 we discuss the empirical strategy for 
modelling intergenerational transfers and their mechanics in the simulation program. Data issues and other 
empirical details, as well as the some insights on income netting algorithms preceding the module itself, are 
provided in the Appendices. 
 
2.  The Wealth module sequence 
 
The Wealth Module of CAPP_DYN starts the simulation from the panel dataset provided by the pre existing 
blocks of the model, where demographic events, labour incomes and a full range of social security benefits are 
simulated for the period 2008 205010. Consistently with the previous part of the model, the base year population 
is represented by the 2002 wave of the Bank of Italy’s Survey of Households Income and Wealth (SHIW). As the 
SHIW suffers of an heavy financial assets under estimation due to under reporting, we employ the adjusted 
wealth data from D’Aurizio et al. (2006) on the same source
11. 
The sequence of processes for the mechanisms of formation, transmission and accumulation/spend down of 
household wealth are synthetically reported in figure 1.  
The  module  adopts  the  traditional  recursive  logics  of  dynamics  MSMs  ,  included  CAPP_DYN,  –  i.e.  it 
estimates all the variables in year (t) and uses them to determine the transition probabilities in year (t+1). In 
addition, some of the simulated processes have a dynamic specification themselves and have been estimated on 
                                                           
10 The main implication is that feedbacks from wealth to demographic and occupational decision are not allowed for. In a 
further development of the research the Wealth Module will be sequentially integrated with the other pre existing modules. 
11 See Appendix A for details on SHIW and adjustment of financial wealth. 5 
 
the panel component of SHIW using the lagged dependent12 among the covariates. The decisional unit for the 
wealth processes is the household13. 
In short, the module begins by modeling the intergenerational transmission of wealth, which includes inter vivos 
and mortis causa transfers. Following, the model updates each wealth component as a random walk, with its specific 
asset returns. Concerning financial wealth, before determining the current value, we preliminarily estimate the 
propensity and (if positive) the share of financial resources allocated in risky assets, using a selection model à la 
Heckman (results provided in the appendix B). 
Next the module runs the investment part which is leaded by the house equity decisions (buying, selling and 
amount): these processes are carried out by means of a traditional two part model, combining discrete choice 
models (logit, plus Monte Carlo techniques in simulation) for the probability of being a seller or a buyer, and 
OLS models for the determination of the amount of the house bought. Every time a household is selected for a 
transition in the housing market, debt (i.e. stock of capital borrowed) and the new mortgage instalment (if any) 
are re computed.  
In case of a purchase decision, the model distinguishes among three modalities of financing the assets which 
will  be  described  in  details  later  in  the  section.  The  final  steps  of  the  loop  determines  yearly  household 
consumption expenditure, provided the computation of the Human Lifetime Resources, and ultimately performs 
the last recursive process, i.e. the determination of yearly household savings. In figure 1 we show the structure of 
the Wealth Module and the sequence of its main tasks. 
 
                                                           
12 CAPP_DYN is a discrete time annual model, while our main estimation dataset (the Bank of Italy Survey of Household Income 
and Wealth) has a biannual frequency. This fact causes an underestimation of persistence in the simulated dynamic models. 
We are aware of this problem, nevertheless,  at the state of the art, a annual panel data source with the information we need 
is  not  available  for  Italy  and  we  believe  the  advantages  of  fitting,  on  the  whole,  a    better  model  (especially  for  the 
consumption rule) overtake the drawback of an underestimated persistence. 
13 Consistently with the demographic hypotheses which ground CAPP_DYN we use a definition of household which 
excludes  non nuclear, composite structure families.  
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For simulation purposes, we adopt a re coding of SHIW wealth variables in two macro aggregates: (a) house 
equity (real wealth) (b) an enlarged financial wealth component, which includes all financial assets plus tangible 
goods other than real estate (which will be assimilated to non risky assets). Net worth is obtained by subtracting 
financial debt (if any) from total gross wealth.  
As mentioned above, the first simulated events are the intergenerational transfers of wealth between parents 
and  children  outside  the  family  of  origin.  The  inter vivos  transfers  have  been  modeled  by  means  of  a 
probabilistic approach based on a Heckman two steps procedure in order to account for the selection bias, while 
bequests have a mechanical connotation. It is worth noticing that, due to insufficient information on financial 
transfers in the SHIW for our purposes, a different micro data source specifically focused on this issue has been 7 
 
employed: the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE). Details on the econometrics and the 
functioning of such a crucial sub module are discussed in section 5.  
Once transfers have fully accomplished14, every household (included the new born ones), have an initial 
wealth stock.15 Next, an updating of wealth stock is operated by assigning a specific return on each assets in 
order to determine current wealth value. Returns are derived from an i.i.d draw from a specific normal (or 
Pearson)  distribution  with  mean,  variance  (and  kurtosis)  derived  from  available  time  series  for  Italy  (see 
footnotes 13, 14, 15 and 18)16. This step introduces the individual portfolio risk in private accumulation process. 
The current house equity value of household h, (AHt) is obtained by multiplying the lagged value of real wealth 
by (1 plus) the rate of return on real assets rht (random walk) 17. Concerning financial wealth, in order to account 
for differential returns on the share of risky ( t )18 and non risky19 assets, we preliminarily estimate financial 
wealth allocation between these two components with a dynamic model20 accounting for persistence in risk 
attitude21 and for the role of other observables (see appendix B). Since (in the baseline) we assume the non risky 
share of financial accrues a null real return, the weighted rate of return on overall enlarged financial assets 
amounts to  trf 
t , where the latter rate is a specific return on financial risky assets obtained as an i.i.d draw from a 
asset return specific distribution22. The updated value for the enlarged financial aggregate for the household 
(AFt) is then determined as the lagged financial wealth multiplied by (1 plus) the weighted returns and then 
increased by the previous period savings (St 1). The outstanding debt is, in first stance, obtained by subtracting 
the capital component of mortgage instalment paid in the previous period (Rtcap) from its lagged value (
t 1 B ). 
Here we adopt the convention that all households repay the mortgage in 20 years23 (i.e. roughly the average 
mortgage duration in Italy, according to Rossi, 2008); thus, capital mortgage instalment Rtcap amounts to 1/20 of 
borrowed  capital  stock  (Bt),  while  total  installment  (including  interest)  is  computed 
as   = + + -  
20 20 (1 ) ((1 ) 1)
t t
tot m m m R B r r r , where rm is assumed to be normally distributed with mean equal to 3% and 
standard deviation amounting to 0.5% (in the baseline). For this formula to be true, we assume the borrowing 
                                                           
14 See section 5 for a thorough description of the private transferring processes 
15  This  stock,  in  the  first  year  of  simulation,  is  drawn  from  the  base  year  population  dataset  (SHIW  2002)  and  it  is 
stochastically processed by the transfer sub module. 
16 We consider different hypotheses on the returns of the various assets in order to carry out sensitivity analyses, obtaining a 
benchmark, a low and a high accumulation scenarios. 
17 In the benchmark scenario we have adjusted the average return over the 1970 2007 period from Muzzicato et al. (2002) 
amounting to about 2.5% by imputing a lower (very long run) rate (2%). At the same time we impute a moderate 8% 
standard deviation, close to that estimated by Cannari et al. (2008) for houses prices in Italy. 
18 This aggregate is composed of stocks, mutual funds, private bonds, foreign government bonds, shares of limited liability 
companies. 
19 Non risky assets include bank and postal deposits CDs, PCTs, BFPs and government securities. We also added real 
(tangible) goods other than real estate. 
20 Such allocation is estimated through a Heckman two steps model. 
21 A static model determines initial conditions for new households. 
22 In the benchmark simulation we assume a 3% real returns with a standard deviation equal to 18% and an excess of 
kurtosis of 2.4 for risky assets. These values amount to a weighted average among short, medium and very long run returns 
for Italy computed by Dimson et al. (2006). Figures for a wide set of countries are available in the DMS Global Returns 
database. 
23 If a household extinguishes before the debt has been repaid, it simply transmits its overall net worth to its heirs according 
to the rule defined in section 5. 8 
 
rate – rm – to be fixed over time once the mortgage has been subscribed and the mortgage repayment to be 
constant. The net wealth is then given by the sum of real and financial wealth minus the outstanding debt (i.e. 
mortgage being the only form of borrowing we allow in the model).  
In  the  following step  the model  simulates  choices  affecting  the  stock  of real  estate  and  the  number  of 
dwellings owned by the family. The decisions of purchasing or selling a house work on a set of discrete choice 
model  (logit,  estimated  on  the  pooling  of  1989 2006  waves  of  SHIW HA,  see  Appendix  C)  combined,  in 
simulation, with Monte Carlo techniques and then the totals are calibrated to match an external source (ISTAT, 
2005)24. First, the model distinguishes between households already owning at least a house, which are allowed to 
sell a property, and households not owning any house equity, which are not allowed to sell. Once the family is 
selected for the “sale” event, the value of house equity sold AHst is “heuristically” assumed to be the current 
value of real wealth divided by the number of houses owned. The new value of household real wealth is the 
difference between the current real wealth and the value of the sold house. 
The financial wealth is assumed to increase by the value of equity in case exceeding the existing debt, while the 
latter (if exists) falls by the price of equity sold up to its outstanding value; finally, the new mortgage (total and 
capital) instalment is computed on the new debt (if any).  
When  a  household  is  selected  –  through  an  analogous  procedure  (logit)  –  for  buying,  the  value  of  the 
purchased dwelling is estimated by means of an OLS on a pooling of SHIW cross sections (1989 2006) using the 
ratio of house value to household net wealth as dependent variable. In case a household is selected for buying, 
the model distinguishes among three cases:  
i)  purchase with down spending up to 90%25 of the enlarged financial wealth; in this case financial wealth 
decumulates by the price of the house bought, real wealth increase by the same amount and the eventual debt 
does not vary; 
ii)   if the price of the house exceeds the 90% threshold, the financial advance can be complemented with 
creation of new debt for the difference between the value of the house and the 90% of financial wealth; real and 
financial wealth are updated accordingly; 
iii)  if at least one of the two spouses has an accrued end of service allowance26 and the purchase concerns 
the first house, a 70% redemption of it is allowed as a set off of debt contracted in ii), possible difference 
exceeding the debt re integrating the financial wealth (decumulated by 90%).  
                                                           
24 Since SHIW data seems to severely under report the official trade flows in the housing market for the household sector, 
we fit the econometric models in order to model  systematic differences in house equity decisions according to  some 
observable characteristics then we align the totals to match external aggregate data. According to ISTAT among 2002 and 
2008 in Italy around 1 million of real estate buying and selling per year have been recorded. This level corresponds to about 
a 4.5 percent households per year involved in house equity purchasing/building. We assume this frequency to be stable all 
over the simulation.  
25 This is an assumption aimed at avoiding households to completely run out of their overall resources. 
26 In Italy, private sector employees benefit of an additional relevant resource at retirement which is called TFR (end of 
service allowance). In practice, TFR is a deferred share of wage, which can also be partially redeemed in some special cases, 
and in particular for the purchase of the 1st house or can be completely or partially devolved to complementary pension 
funds. 9 
 
Finally, since the issued debt may be excessively high due to low financial assets relative to the price of the 
house, we operate a control on the sustainability of mortgage by imposing a ceiling to the (total) instalment, as 
the 40% of the current household net labour and pension income27. In case the instalment exceeds the threshold, 
we force the instalment to the ceiling and re compute the maximum sustainable debt given current resources. 
Subtracting the pre existing debt from this amount, one gets the maximum amount which can be loaned in 
the current period for the purchase of the house. Finally, the maximum value of house bought consistent with 
the new stock of debt is re computed by summing the 90% financial resources and the maximum amount which 
can be loaned for the current period, plus the 70% of TFR for households which are constrained despite its 
redemption. 
In the last steps of the loop the model predicts household human lifetime resources, which are the present 
discounted value of labour incomes stream up to retirement plus the pension income flows up to household 
extinction  (see  section  3.1  for  details).  Such  aggregate  is  crucial  for  determining  household  consumption 
expenditure28 and finally yearly household savings are obtained as the difference between disposable labour and 
pension incomes (net of mortgage instalment) and consumption. In the following sections we try to focus, one 
by one, on the main aspects we briefly mentioned in this section. 
 
3.  The households saving/consumption behaviour 
 
In  this  section  we  illustrate  the  theoretical  background  modelling  behaviour  of  households  in  allocating 
resources for consumption among different periods of their life. Our main task is to fit our data as better as 
possible  while,  at  the  same  time,  representing  household  consumption  behaviour  through  a  quite  general 
expression for the consumption rule. This latter, once estimated, is implemented in the simulation program and 
aims at catching some possible behavioural reactions related to gradual changes in pension outcome expectations 
as a consequence of a radical social security reform which is characterized by a long transitional phase. 
Assuming a homothetic   non separable over time   utility function29, a closed form life cycle consumption 
function from the optimization problem as elaborated in Modigliani and Brumberg (1954 and 1979) can be 
derived. Hence, our general formulation   in order to get an approximate optimizing model   is given by: 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
It is computed as 6.91% of the yearly gross wage and can be reasonably approximated with one gross monthly wage. It 
accrues at an yearly rate equal to 1.5% plus 75% the inflation. The introduction of TFR in the model serves to a twofold 
purpose: 
1)  allows for financing house purchase, making liquidity constraint less bounding 
2)  modelling the financing of complementary pension funds. 
At the moment we have attempted to model the first issue, although, the inclusion of TFR in the model paves the way for 
future developments of the second point whenever data availability will allow to model such an aspect. 
27 The average incidence of mortgage repayment on household income is around 30% in Italy (Rossi, 2008) 
28 Actual consumption cannot exceed the sum of all disposable households income and the “liquid” financial wealth [(1  
 
t)AF] net of any mortgage installment. Of course for some household this constraint is bounding and they are not allowed 
to consume their “desired” amount of resources. 
29 Nagatani (1972), Hayashi (1982) and Zeldes (1989) argue a sensible way to account for income uncertainty, without 
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a = age of household head 
t
a C = current consumption 
1 t
a C
- = last period consumption for the same household (internal habit) 
 
t
a A  = non human household wealth in year t when the age of household head is a  
t
a y = current household disposable income (earnings and pensions)  in year t when the age of household head 
is a  
  = period constant probability of household extinction30 
H = household characteristics and type 
r = real interest rate 
Following Willman (2003) we can derive an algebraic expression for current consumption which in its implicit 
form is given by: 
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Where, in particular, HR represents the (expected) life time human resources (or human wealth) given by the 
discounted future labour and pension incomes stream. As we are going to explain in the next sub sections the 
"structural" element of the equation resides in the introduction of expectations about future income stream, 
through the role of human resources, as a determinant of household consumption. This approach requires in 
turn HR to be re programmed every period. 
1 t
a C
-  represent the role of habit in consumption. 
For  the  estimation  we  chose  an  empirical  specification  which  nicely  describes  the  consumption/saving 
behavior of Italian household in our sample, summarized by the following formula: 
1
1 2 1 = ( ) ( )          (2)
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For our practical purposes we neglect uncertainty in the future income stream. Moreover, we assume the discount factor to 
be equal to the exogenous growth rate in productivity (wage growth) in every period. 
30 Following Blanchard (1985) agents face each period a constant probability of death (π)   instead of being infinitely lived   
implying uncertain lifetime. For practical needs of our dynamic micro simulation framework we neglect such a source of 
uncertainty in the estimation and in the simulation of the consumption rule, by assuming households take as reference for 
household life time planning the expected age of death of surviving spouse (Tt)  as in Ando and Nicoletti Altimari (2004). 11 
 
 
We will discuss the implications of such an empirical specification and the econometric estimation in section 
4. 
In the dynamic simulation program this equation provides us with a predicted value for the current level of 
consumption  ˆ t C .  In order to account for the role of liquidity constraints, which should not be neglected in a 
distributional analysis, we compute current simulated consumption as: 
{ } ˆ min , y (1 )         (3)
t t t t t t
tot C C AF R j = + - -  
i.e. current household consumption can never exceed the sum of current disposable income plus the liquid 
share of enlarged financial wealth (non risky assets), net of the mortgage instalment (if any). 
 
3.1  Household lifetime human resources (HR)  
 
Before turning to the proper empirical specification of the household consumption rule, we focus on the 
definition of total household expected Human Wealth, whose estimation is propedeutic to the estimation of the 
consumption  rule.  The  expected  value  of  Human  Wealth  (or  human  resources)  is  empirically  obtained  by 
aggregating spouses' individual projected (after tax) incomes (earnings and pensions), plus the stream of adult 
children's expected labour incomes up to the age of 30, plus one year of earnings contribution of active children 
over 30. That is the assumptions are under 30 active children will leave the family of origin at 30, while over 30 
active children are going to exit in one year. We know these are arbitrary hypotheses that leave room for 
refinements on the base of an in depth study of the evolution of individuals demographic behaviour. However, 
at the state of the art they represent sensible, though simplifying, hypotheses that, as we will show in section 4, 
provide a good fit of our data in the analysis of household consumption behaviour. 
In algebraic terms: 
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where: 
k = 1,2 adult members 
j = active children up to 30 living in the household 
+ , k
t
k a i w = net labour income of household member k (or j) expected in year t  when he/she will be aged a+i 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
31 As we discussed above our reference propensity to consume out of human resources is the two year lag value of the 




k a i P +  = net old age pension benefit of household member k  expected in year t when he/she will be aged a+i, 
or, if already retired, projection of current old age (or survivor) pension benefit in year t when he/she will be 
aged a+i 
pk = expected retirement age for spouse k 
ak = age of spouse k 
Tk = expected death age for spouse k (ISTAT projections) 
Therefore, in order to evaluate this (stock) variable we need to evaluate its three main components, that is the 
household life time labour income, the expected social security wealth for active individuals and the current 
(residual)  social  security  wealth  for  the  individuals  who  are  already  retired.  It  is  worth  noting  that  in  the 
simulation program the predicted values of estimated equations used to build HR are re computed – using the 
current simulated values of explanatory variables   every year in order to obtain the current value of HR which, 
in turn, is a determinant of the yearly simulated consumption. 
These topics will be the subject of the next two sections. 
To conclude this sub section we show the evolution of the variable HR and its components all over the 
estimation period and across the households population in SHIW data (figure 2).  
From 1991 to 2006 the average value of the household human resources decreases from 482 to 393 thousand 
Euros  while  the  average  current  household  income  (excluded  capital  incomes)  increases  from  26.5  to  28.9 
thousand Euros (all values are in real terms, price 2002). This decreasing trend of HR is explained by the 
downward trend of the expected household life cycle earnings (from 277 to 194 thousand Euros) and the 
expected social security wealth (from 151 to 110) components and is partially offset by the increasing trend of 
the  residual  social  security  wealth  component  (from  52  to  84,  representing  the  pension  wealth  of  those 
individuals who are already receiving an old age or a survivor pension benefit). 
 






















































1990 1995 2000 2005
Year
 Human Resources  Life Cycle Earnings
 expected SSW  residual SSW
 current Income (right axis)
 
Source: Author’s computations on SHIW 1989 2006, Euros 2002 
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Demography plays a crucial role in the relative weight of each HR component. In figure 3 (left panel) we show 
the mean age of the active spouses (i.e. those who contribute the most to the life cycle earnings component of 
the family) which increases from 42.4 in 1989 to almost 47 in 2006. This fact implies, on average, a shorter 
residual active life also with respect to the planned age of retirement which, from 1993 to 2006 increases, on 
average, 2.1 years only, passing from 60.1 to 62.4 (figure 4, left panel). At the same time the average number of 
earners in the family (figure 4, right) just slightly increases, passing from 1.63 in 1991 to 1.65 in 2006 with its 
peak in 1995 (1.68 earners per household). With regard to the weight of different age group in the society, we 
can notice a steady downward trend of non student under 30 (from 45% to 29%) mirrored by an as much steady 
upward trend in the weight of over 65 individuals (from 8% to 21.4%). This evidence explains the increase in the 
residual social security wealth component of HR. 
Finally, with regard to the decreasing trend in the expected social security wealth component of HR, a non 
negligible role is attributable to the significant fall in the average expected replacement rate32 which, especially 
after 1998 decreases ten percentage points, from about .76 to about .66 (figure 4, left panel). 
 
Figure 3.: Average evolution of active spouses age (left panel) 




























































1990 1995 2000 2005
Year
 under 30 non-student  31-40
 41-50  51-65
 over 65
 
Source: Author’s computations on SHIW 1989 2006, Euros 2002 
 
In order to demonstrate how demography matters in determining the average evolution of the household 
human  resources,  in  figure  5  we  show  the  average  pattern  of  the  individual  expected  life  cycle  earnings 
component  by  age  classes  (left  panel)  and  the  evolution  of  the  relative  composition  of  such  age  classes 
themselves (right panel). From this analysis we exclude all of the individuals who do not contribute to this 
component of HR (i.e. students, house wives, pensioners, well off people voluntarily out of the labour market) 
or  contribute  with  a  minor  weight  (i.e.  active  children  under  30),  therefore  we  restrict  the  analysis  to  the 
household head and his/her spouse (if any).  
                                                           
32 Expected replacement rate is the expected value of the ratio between last earnings before retirement and the first old age 
pension benefit, declared by adult individual in SHIW. This variable, as we will see in section 3.1.2, is crucial in determining 
the value of the expected social security wealth component of HR and, therefore, of HR itself. 14 
 
In general, the average expectation about future earnings for each age class moderately increases according to 
the moderate growth recorded in the period 1991 2006. What is dramatically changing in the same period is the 
relative composition of the age classes. In particular, the class of under 30 individuals (living out of their family 
origin, i.e. living in their new family alone or with a partner/spouse) that in 1991 represents more than 10 
percent of all individuals, in 2006 is reduced to less than 3 percent. The age group 31 40 passes from 31 to 21 
percent. The individuals of these two groups contribute to the greatest expected stock of life cycle earnings. On 
the opposite, individuals with a lower expected stock of life time earnings, in particular over 50,  pass from 23 to 
35 percent of all individuals.  
In other words, in the period 1991 2006 both the demographic and labor market behavior of the individuals is 
dramatically changed. Nevertheless, even though the average age of formation of an autonomous family unit and 
the average age of entry in the labor market have been significantly delaying, younger people plan to retire, on 
average, just two year later compared their parents.  
Of course, such results can be sensitive to the various hypotheses that underlie the construction of HR 
variable. Anyway, they raise several questions about the likely consequences in terms of  savings, labour supply 
behaviours and, in the final analysis, long run wealth and income distributions of the changing institutional 
framework. The answers will depend, among other things, on the hypotheses that one formulates about the likely 
evolution of labor market and pension expectations as well as the actual rules of decision which will lead life time 
labour supply in the next decades. 
 
Figure 4.: Average evolution of pension expectations (left panel) 
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Figure 5.:Avg expected life cycle earnings by age class (left) and relative composition (right) 
 
 
Source: Author’s computations on SHIW 1991  2006, Euros 2002 
 
  In the next subsections we discuss how we estimate and how we manage in the simulation program 
every single component of HR. 
 
3.1.1 Individual life time income profiles  
 
Individual lifetime earnings are defined as the present discounted value of future expected labour income 
flows up to the planned age of retirement. The projection in t for income at time t+i (where i is a generic period 
between t – current year – and the age of retirement (pk   t)) for each individual k or j is obtained as the prediction 
of the deterministic part of the following econometric models33 where age is ak+i: 
( )
( )
t t t t t
k,a+i k,a+i 1 k,a+i k,a+i t ka+i
=0
t t t t
k,a+i k,a+i k,a+i k t ka+i
=0
     5a
or
     5b
lny =ρlny +β'x +γ'pa +E ε    if  wage>0 in t 
lny =β'x +γ'pa +u +E ν            if  wage=0 in t  
        





where  , ln
t
k a y is  the  log  of  individual  labour  income  net  of  personal  income  tax  and  social  security 
contribution, the x vector includes the set of observables such as educational level achieved, occupation, type of 
employer, full (part time),  pa is a polynomial in age vector interacted with individual characteristics.  
We employ two models estimated on the panel component of SHIW using 1989 2006 waves to obtain a 
projection of labour income up to retirement. 
                                                           
33 In the simulation stage, the model uses the current disposable income   which is obtained by applying a netting algorithm 
(see appendix E) to the gross labour income generated by the “Incomes Module” in CAPP_DYN – as the initial condition 











ε ~ N 0,σ
u ~ N 0,σ
ν ~ N 0,σ16 
 
In particular, we use a dynamic specification to estimate the process to be simulated when the individual has a 
positive wage in the current period (which represents the lagged variable for the prediction of the expected wage 
for the following year) (5.a), while we use a static specification to estimate the process for active individuals with 
zero wage, e.g. in case of unemployment (5.b), which is fitted on both employed and unemployed individuals(see, 
appendix D). 
Hence, the present value of the expected labour income at a generic age a+i,  , j
t
k a i y +  is then given by the 
predicted value of the earnings model when age=a+i: 
, 1 , ( ' ' )
,
1




k a i k k a i k k
k
y x pa t i
k a i y e g
r b g
d
+ - + + +
+
  = +   +  
 
where the (1+g) factor allows the wage level to be linked to the medium long run productivity growth which is 
calibrated through the “Scenario” block of the pre existing CAPP_DYN. For simplicity, we assume δ (the inter 
temporal discount rate) to be equal to g.  
Finally, in order to obtain individual lifetime income, we need to sum the present value of the projected labour 
incomes for every t from the current period up to the expected retirement age pk. However, pk is not known a 
priori as well. 
Indeed, pk, along with the expected replacement rate  , j
t
k p w , plays a key role in determining both lifetime 
income as well as the expected social security wealth. Therefore, in the following section, a method   based on 
subjective expectations declared in SHIW coupled with conjectures about their evolution   is illustrated in order 
to estimate these two variables. 
 
3.1.2  Planned retirement age and (related) expected replacement rate 
 
As we mentioned in the introduction, reforms implemented from 1992 to 2007 have significantly affected the 
institutional social security framework, introducing a tight actuarial link between contributions paid and pension 
received back reducing abruptly the expected replacement ratio for future pensioners and assuring the long term 
financial sustainability of the social security system. 
These new computational rules are going to affect incentives to retire. While for individuals whose pension is 
computed  with  the  old  defined  benefit  (DB)  formula  the  expected  retirement  age  can  be  reasonably 
approximated with the legal provision (or with the age individuals accrue the seniority requirements), for workers 
falling under the mixed and especially under the notional defined contribution (NDC) regime, the expected 
retirement age presents troublesome elements. In fact, we need to model the behaviour of individuals which are 
going to face radically different scenarios and therefore will not be able to draw from the experience of previous 
generations. 17 
 
For this purpose, since we consider subjective expectations to matter in economic decisions, we use the 
expected replacement rate and the planned retirement age information reported in the SHIW34 survey and we 
build an econometric model for imputing out of sample values. As already showed in figure 4 (left), data support 
the  hypothesis  of  an  increase  in  the  expected  retirement  age  and  a decrease  in  the  expectations  on future 
replacement rates as long as we consider recent survey waves, suggesting a partial internalization of the effect of 
pension reforms is taking place in the expectations formation process. 
Because  planned  retirement  age  (plan_ret_age)  and  expected  replacement  rate  (exp_repratio)  are  slightly 
negatively correlated (ρ= .14) but part of their variability may be jointly determined, there is a strong likelihood 
that there will be a correlation between  plan_ret_age and the error term in the model of expected replacement 
rate. This correlation would violate one of the basic assumptions of independence in OLS regression. Therefore, 
as a check, we carry out a Hausman test to verify if differences between an OLS estimates of exp_repratio with 
plan_ret_age among the regressors and a 2SLS estimates are big enough to suggest OLS estimates are not 
consistent. Actually, we find a significant difference between OLS and 2SLS35 estimates (chi square = 26.54, df 
=1, p = 0.0000) and the reason for the inconsistency of OLS is endogeneity of plan_ret_age. 
In order to better account for this kind of endogeneity we than choose to  fit a three stage estimation for 
systems of simultaneous equations, since plan_ret_age is simultaneously dependent of the first equation and 
explanatory variable in the second equation (exp_repratio) of the system. Moreover, 3sls is, in general, more 
efficient than 2sls. The estimates, reported in table 1, are obtained on a pooling of 2000 to 2006 SHIW waves. 
Since the dependent variables of the two equations are not normal but multi modal, though quite symmetric (see 
figure 6), we do not  log transform them and therefore we can not interpret the estimated coefficients in terms of 
elasticities. 
With  regard  to  the  first  equation  of  the  system  i.e.  the  planned  age  of  retirement  we  can  notice  the 
contributive seniority (and its square) have a coefficient equal to  0.5 ( 0.009) while in order to account for the 
effect of age and its strong collinearity we interact the latter with the former. Then, we can interpret its positive 
and significant coefficient (.15) as counter effect of age (perhaps due to an adjustment of individuals planning 
when they approach to retirement), given the expected negative impact of seniority. Females, on average, plan to 
retire two year before males while individuals who fall under NDC regime (younger) declare a .6 years delay but 
with a very low statistical significance36. More educated individuals plan to retire later (also due to a delayed entry 
in the labour market) as well as self employed (1.2 year), while workers in the public sector and home owner plan 
to retire slightly before other individuals. Finally, southern people and singles plan to retire on average .6 years 
later. Time dummies catch the slight upward revision in planned retirement in the more recent  waves, while 
                                                           
34 For declared values of planned retirement age higher than 80 or lower than 50, we considered them to be misreported and 
drop them from the analysis. The non reporting rate among the selected individuals (i.e. excluding students, pensioners, 
house wives and voluntarily well off individuals out of work) of these two expectation variables from 2000 to 2006 (the 
estimation period) is around 20% each wave. For an analysis of retirement expectations and pension reforms on SHIW, see 
Bottazzi et. al, 2006. 
35 In particular, the coefficient of plan_ret_age estimated by OLS has a negative sign, while, using instrumental variables it 
shows, as expected, a moderate but significant positive effect on the expected replacement rate. 
36 We guess for younger people is more difficult to have a clear idea of their likely age of retirement. 18 
 
cohort dummies do not catch a clear cut pattern apart from the fact that individuals who were born after 1953 
plan to retire later than older individuals. 
Looking at the second equation, the expected  replacement rate, we can see how the simultaneous estimation 
corrects the endogeneity of planned retirement age as a regressor by estimating a positive, significant, coefficient 
(0.026),  the  seniority,  as  expected,  has  a  positive  impact  (0.0065)  while  its  interaction  with  age  has  a  low 
significance, small,  negative effect. Individuals which fall under the NDC pension scheme expect, on average, 6 
points less in their future replacement rate. Education is slightly positively related pension outcome expectations, 
while self employed expect more than 11 points less than employees. Also in this equation, but with a more clear 
pattern, time dummies catch the recent (downward) revision in pension outcome expectations, while cohort 
dummies surprisingly show, coeteris paribus, that the younger the cohort the higher the expectation about future 
replacement rate. This evidence provide us with a further clue about the incomplete internalization of pension 
reforms, especially by younger individuals, those who are expected to bear the heaviest burden of the reform 
itself. 
 
Figure 6: kernel distribution of planned retirement age  
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Source: Author’s computations on SHIW HA 2000 2006 
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 Table 1: Three-stage least-squares regression of planned age of retirement  
and the expected replacement rate 
Equation  Obs  Parms  RMSE  R sq  chi2  P 
1.Plan_ret_age  27194  21  3.435451  0.257  9408.45  0.0000 
2.exp_repratio  27194  21 
0.163388
1  0.149  5034.9  0.0000 
 Planned  
Age of 
Retirement  b     se  t  ci95    
Year_contrib   0.5005  ***  0.0117   42.7746   0.5234   0.4776 
Year_contrib2   0.0094  ***  0.0003   33.6790   0.0099   0.0088 
Age*contrib.  0.0146  ***  0.0003  50.6142  0.0141  0.0152 
Female   2.0850  ***  0.0445   46.8655   2.1722   1.9978 
NDC  0.6392 
 
0.4316  1.4810   0.2067  1.4852 
upper_secondary  0.2882  ***  0.0473  6.0992  0.1956  0.3808 
degree_or_more  0.9429  ***  0.0722  13.0645  0.8014  1.0843 
self_employed  1.2191  ***  0.0548  22.2332  1.1116  1.3265 
Public   0.2453  ***  0.0541   4.5317   0.3514   0.1392 
home_owner   0.1130  *  0.0473   2.3889   0.2057   0.0203 
South  0.6049  ***  0.0496  12.1973  0.5077  0.7021 
Single  0.6131  ***  0.0850  7.2156  0.4466  0.7796 
tau2002  0.2049  ***  0.0594  3.4480  0.0884  0.3213 
tau2004  0.4154  ***  0.0618  6.7182  0.2942  0.5366 
tau2006  0.1333  *  0.0651  2.0498  0.0058  0.2608 
coor_53  1.2315  ***  0.0881  13.9715  1.0587  1.4042 
coor_58  2.1149  ***  0.1063  19.8864  1.9064  2.3233 
coor_63  2.3574  ***  0.1239  19.0261  2.1145  2.6002 
coor_68  2.3954  ***  0.1403  17.0789  2.1205  2.6703 
coor_73  2.2184  ***  0.1547  14.3440  1.9153  2.5216 
coor_78  1.9241  ***  0.1718  11.2020  1.5874  2.2608 
Intercept  61.2566  ***  0.1635  374.6603  60.9362  61.5771 
Expected   
Replacement Rate   b     se  t  ci95    
Plan_ret_age      0.0026  **  0.0008  3.0374  0.0009  0.0042 
Year_contrib  0.0065  ***  0.0007  9.0171  0.0051  0.0079 
Age*contrib   0.00003  *  0.00001   2.3585   0.0001  0.0000 
NDC   0.0602  **  0.0205   2.9305   0.1004   0.0199 
Single  0.0095  *  0.0040  2.3591  0.0016  0.0174 
Upper secondary  0.0147  ***  0.0022  6.5689  0.0103  0.0191 
Degree or more  0.0180  ***  0.0035  5.1788  0.0112  0.0248 
Self emplolyed   0.1161  ***  0.0028   40.9061   0.1217   0.1105 
Public  0.0404  ***  0.0026  15.5535  0.0353  0.0455 
Partime   0.0395  ***  0.0041   9.5667   0.0476   0.0314 
Centre  0.0349  ***  0.0025  13.7470  0.0299  0.0399 
South  0.0424  ***  0.0026  16.2899  0.0373  0.0475 
tau2002   0.0339  ***  0.0028   12.0049   0.0395   0.0284 
tau2004   0.0506  ***  0.0030   17.1257   0.0564   0.0448 20 
 
tau2006   0.0789  ***  0.0030   25.8982   0.0848   0.0729 
coor_53  0.0119  **  0.0041  2.8883  0.0038  0.0200 
coor_58  0.0221  ***  0.0050  4.4482  0.0124  0.0318 
coor_63  0.0334  ***  0.0056  5.9518  0.0224  0.0444 
coor_68  0.0449  ***  0.0061  7.3957  0.0330  0.0568 
coor_73  0.0607  ***  0.0064  9.4358  0.0481  0.0733 
coor_78  0.0704  ***  0.0069  10.1260  0.0567  0.0840 
Intercept  0.4337  ***  0.0539  8.0513  0.3281  0.5392 
Endogenous variables:  plan_ret_age, exp_repratio 
Source: Author’s computations on SHIW 2000 2006 
 
In the light of this empirical analysis, since the adjustment process of expectations has not fully accomplished 
yet,  assuming    pension  expectations  will  remain  unchanged  in  the  future  would  be  unreasonable.  On  the 
opposite, we guess these expectations to become more and more accurate with the process of time. 
Therefore, the projected values for these two variables pk and  , j
t
k p w (both generically called y) are computed as 
a weighted average between the predicted values by the econometric model above (ŷ) and the values simulated by 
the “Pension module” (y*)37 of CAPP_DYN for those individuals retiring during the simulation period (within 
2050). For the individuals not retiring in the simulation period (the younger), we assume the predicted value of 
the model to converges linearly towards a long run mean value estimated (by a regression on the 2045 2050 
simulated data) for subgroups of population. Therefore: 
 
y  =    ŷ + (1   ) y*    (6) 
 
The weight of this average  Î(0,1) is closer to zero the closer the year of simulation to 2050 (i.e. the more the 
pension outcomes of the new NDC regime become observable) and the more the worker is close to his/her 
retirement age (the more one is close to the retirement age, the more he/she is aware about the exact moment of 
retirement and about his/her pension amount). 
0.5 0.5 1
   = [1    *(year 2003)]*(  1)/         (7)
2050 2003






We believe the assumption of a convergence in pension expectations toward actual (simulated) future values is 
sensible,  albeit  arbitrary.  In  fact,  although  those  values  are  exogenous  to  the  Wealth  module  because,  as 
previously discussed, feedbacks from this latter to the former modules are not allowed yet  and we are aware this 
fact is open to criticism on several grounds, nevertheless, the social security module of CAPP_DYN  following a 
rule of exit which essentially plays along with the increase in the legal provision  provides an evaluation of the 
pension benefit and therefore of the replacement rate which is consistent with a given seniority and with the 
computational rules related to the particular pension scheme an individual falls in. In other words, we assume 
                                                           
37 As mentioned before, these information are produced by pre existing CAPP_DYN blocks before the Wealth module starts 
to simulate.  21 
 
that, given a simulated age of exit from the labour market which only partially adjusts to offset the future 
decreasing pension coverage, the expectation about the implied replacement rate should converge towards this 
actual value. Therefore the assumption of the convergence provides a further link between the Wealth module 
and the other modules of CAPP_DYN which, at the state of the art, is not yet fully accomplished.   We believe a 
right  and  proper  future  improvement  will  consists  of  allowing  for  feedbacks  from  the  Wealth  module  to 
demographic, labour market and pension decisions. 
Once the expected retirement age has been determined, the number of addenda of the first sum in HR is 
known and then the stock of lifetime human resources can be computed. 
 
 
3.1.3 Social Security wealth 
 
In order to estimate the expected value of future pension benefits, the model computes the expected value of 
the first annuity by multiplying the estimated expected replacement rate  , j
t
k p w by the projection of last labour 
income (in pk 1) : 
   
t
, , k, y         (8)
k kj k
t t
k p k p p P w =  
The expected present value of future pension flows is obtained as the sum of present values of pension 
annuities from retirement to the expected death time (Tk)38 (calibrated according to ISTAT projections) 
,
1











  =   +   ∑  
Finally, SSW values are discounted back to the current period are aggregated for the spouses. By aggregating 
the life time labour incomes component plus the pension component the model produces an estimate of the 
expected value of household human resources (HR). 
 
4.  Estimation of the consumption rule 
 
In this section we discuss the specification and the estimation of the consumption rule whose parameters we 
employ in the simulation program. As mentioned in the introduction, the idea that drives our approach is that 
the likely impact of radical social security reforms on the consumption/savings age profile of Italian households 
asks for a step beyond the estimation of a traditional reduced form Keynesian equation.  In fact, if we look at the 
recent past (i.e. our 1991 2006 panel dataset, figure 7) through a set of kernel regressions, we notice that the 
(equivalent) savings profile of Italian Household is characterized by a quasi flat pattern from around 35 onward, 
with pensioners having, on average, a positive propensity to save even at older ages. 
                                                           
38 Another assumption which improves the fit of our model is the expected residual life for the household (which in turn is 
equal to max between the residual lives of the two spouses, if any) can never be lower than five years. Therefore min tk 
Tk>=5 22 
 
A  broad  literature  has  investigated  the  so  called  “retirement  consumption  puzzle”  in  several  countries 
(Lunberg et al. 2001, Fernandez and Krueger, 2003 and 2004) and, for Italy, some authors explained   at least 
partially     the  high  (private)  savings  propensity  of  elderly  with  the  generosity  of  the  social  security  system 
(Miniaci et. Al, 2003) which, so far, provided pensioners with rather high rate of returns on contributions and 
high replacement rates. Once the social security wealth is included in the total wealth, the savings profile of 
Italian Households turn to be more consistent with the life cycle hypothesis, with a positive propensity up to 
retirement, and a spend down phase in the following period.39  
 
Figure 7: Consumption and saving age profiles in the estimation dataset 
 
 
Source: Author’s computations on SHIW 1991 2006, Nadaraya Watson nonparametric regression, Euros 2002 
 
 
We believe that thinking of this pattern as given and projecting it in the next decades   when social security 
reforms will be fully operational and the generosity of public pensions will be sensibly reduced   would miss an 
important part of the distributional story. In fact, reforms affect especially current young and future workers 
whose  life  cycle  consumption  is  not  or  only  partially  observed  and  whose  expectations  have  only  partially 
embodied  the  long  run  effects  of  the  reforms  themselves.  Therefore,  we  believe  that  linking  consumption 
behavior to a life cycle theoretical framework, while at the same time searching for a specification that fits more 
closely our data, is an appropriate strategy in order to account for such issues. 
As mentioned in section 3., the empirical specification is the following: 
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39 A drop in consumption after retirement still remains to be clarified. Several theoretical and empirical works propose 
different explanations for this stylized fact (Hurd and Rohwedder, 2008; Laitner and Silverman 2005; Fernandèz Villaverde 
and Krueger, 2005. For Italy, Miniaci et al., 2009) 23 
 
Such a functional form, where the dependent is (log of the) consumption to HR ratio, proves to better fit our 
household consumption data all over the distribution, while at the same time, considering the role of habit 
persistence40  and  the  effect  of  future  expectations  about  incomes  and  pensions  outcomes  as  a  crucial 
determinants of current consumption. Moreover, by estimating a propensity instead of a level, in the simulation 
program we get rid of the necessity to make arbitrary assumptions due to the non stationarity of consumption 
which would have implied a moving average and therefore a dynamics in the intercept of the equation. 
In the left panel of figure 8 we depict the lowess regression of the dependent variable over household head’s 
age in SHIW data (which increases non monotonically) while in the right panel we check the distribution of its 
logarithm which is particularly well behaved, closely approximating a normal distribution, with a slight right 
skewness.  
Figure 8.: Consumption over human resources ratio: all households, 
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Source: Author’s computations on SHIW 1991 2006, lowess regression (left) kernel distribution (right) 
 
 
As  a  last  exploratory  analysis  of  our  dependent  variable,  in  figures  9  we  show  its  average  pattern, 
approximated by a cubic fit, by subgroups household types (left) and income quintiles (right). In particular, for 
the former, we divided the household population in five categories: singles, nuclear families (two spouses plus 
children, if any), non nuclear families (households with spouses and active children only, not properly composite 
non nuclear families41), nuclear single headed and non nuclear single headed. As we can notice these household 
types systematically differ each other in their propensity to consume out of their human wealth; therefore, 
controlling for them allows us to account for the effect of demography on consumption in our simulation 
program. Concerning income quintiles, we can notice a different consumption pattern related to current income, 
with,  as  expected,  richer  households  saving  more  out  of  their  human  resources  compared  to  low income 
households. 
                                                           
40 We also estimate a static version of the model for new households with no lagged value of consumption to set the initial 
condition. 
41 Consistently with the demographic hypotheses which ground CAPP_DYN, that is to simulate the evolution of the Italian 
population allowing for nuclear families only, we dropped the household with a non nuclear, composite structure by the 
econometric analysis.  24 
 
Figure 9.: Consumption over human resources ratio, by age:  
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Source: Author’s computations on SHIW 1991 2006, cubic fit.  
 
In order to estimate the dynamic42 consumption function (10) we use a GMM system estimator43 (Arellano, 
Bover, 1995; Blundell, Bond, 1998) with robust standard errors in order to purge the estimations from the bias 
induced by the endogeneity due to individual fixed effect.  
As we discussed above, due to the periodicity of the survey, the reference consumption propensity is the two 
year  lag  causing  a  weaker estimated persistence parameter  (0.115)  when  implemented  in  the discrete  yearly 
simulation program.  
Both  the  enlarged  financial  wealth  and  financial  debt  exert  1.3  percent  elasticities  on  the  propensity  to 
consume out of human resources while house equity shows a negative 2.4 percent elasticity which, however, is to 
be evaluated in the light of the interaction with the number of owned dwellings (0.7 percent). The positive sign 
of the interaction probably indicates a non linear effect of real wealth on the dependent with owners of more 
than  one  property  often  enjoying  actual  rents  (besides  imputed  rents  for  owner occupied  dwellings)  that 
constitute an extra source of (capital) income which can be addressed to consumption; all these coefficients are 
statistically significant at (at least) 1 percent level. The following coefficients shows the consumption to HR ratio 
is decreasing in current household income quintiles (implying, coeteris paribus, better off households saving a 
greater share of current income than poorer), than the non monotonic age pattern and some interactions of age 
with occupational and educational dummies. It is worth noting the negative effect of household head being 
retired ( 7 percent), which confirms the well known one off drop in consumption at the time of retirement.  
Moreover, as expected, the higher the ratio of earners to household members the lower the propensity to 
consume ( 27 percent). Finally, the coeteris paribus effects of household types suggests nuclear families    the 
                                                           
42  Following  Bond  (2002),  allowing  for  dynamics  in  the  underlying  process  “may  be  crucial  for  recovering  consistent 
estimates of other parameters […] Even when coefficients on lagged dependent variables are not of direct interest” 
43 This method proves to be particularly suitable in the estimation of distributed lag models from panels with a large number 
of cross sectional units (N), each observed for a small number of periods (T) 25 
 
reference (omitted) category  are characterized by a lower propensity to consume out of the human life time 
resources44. The estimation ends up with the time dummies45.  
 
Table 2: Dynamic panel-data estimation of the consumption rule, two-step system GMM 
Number of obs = 21776             
Number of groups = 10138 
        Number of instruments = 52 
      Wald chi2(27) =  18813.27 
      Prob > chi2   =     0.000    
        ln{C/HR}  b     se  t  Ci95    
Lag.ln{C/HR}  0.1152  ***  0.0259  4.4556  0.0645  0.1659 
ln_af_en  0.0128  ***  0.0026  4.8835  0.0077  0.0179 
ln_ar_h   0.0244  ***  0.0052   4.7274   0.0345   0.0143 
ln_ar_h*n_houses  0.0069  ***  0.0018  3.8106  0.0034  0.0105 
ln_pf  0.0135  ***  0.0019  7.1701  0.0098  0.0172 
Q2_income   0.1185  ***  0.0197   6.0043   0.1571   0.0798 
Q3_income   0.1589  ***  0.0222   7.1707   0.2024   0.1155 
Q4_income   0.2282  ***  0.0249   9.1813   0.2769   0.1795 
Q5_income   0.2908  ***  0.0289  10.0710   0.3474   0.2342 
age  0.1892  ***  0.0507  3.7288  0.0898  0.2887 
age2   0.0061  ***  0.0014   4.4608   0.0088   0.0034 
age3  0.0001  ***  0.0000  6.0067  0.0001  0.0001 
age4  0.0000  ***  0.0000   7.4470  0.0000  0.0000 
age_self  0.0010  *  0.0004  2.4646  0.0002  0.0019 
age_upsec   0.0011  ***  0.0003   4.1302   0.0017   0.0006 
age_degree   0.0034  ***  0.0004   8.1461   0.0042   0.0025 
Retired   0.0704  **  0.0233   3.0183   0.1162   0.0247 
earners_ratio   0.2705  ***  0.0283   9.5756   0.3259   0.2152 
South   0.0505  ***  0.0119   4.2364   0.0739   0.0271 
Single  0.0171 
 
0.0198  0.8618   0.0218  0.0560 
Nusihehh  0.1080  **  0.0355  3.0388  0.0383  0.1777 
non_nusihehh  0.3959  ***  0.0376  10.5271  0.3222  0.4696 
non_nuclfam  0.1787  ***  0.0163  10.9877  0.1468  0.2106 
tau1991   0.0204 
 
0.0167   1.2196   0.0532  0.0124 
tau1993  0.0500  **  0.0159  3.1525  0.0189  0.0811 
tau1995  0.0890  ***  0.0148  6.0144  0.0600  0.1180 
tau1998  0.0379  *  0.0161  2.3605  0.0064  0.0694 
tau2006  0.0232 
 
0.0131  1.7736   0.0024  0.0488 
Intercept   5.7109  ***  0.7040   8.1118   7.0908   4.3311 
 
Arellano Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  15.34  Pr > z =  0.000 
Arellano Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =   0.59  Pr > z =  0.552 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(23)   =  72.23  Prob > chi2 =  0.000 
                                                           
44  It  is  worth  to  stress  once  more  that  our  definition  of  non nuclear  household  does  not  include  proper  “composite 
structure” families with more than two adult members (except children) living in. Actually, if we allowed for this group in 
the analysis it would probably represent the highest savers group. 
45 These latter coefficients obviously are not employed in the simulation program but serve for purging the equation from 
time specific effects only. 
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    Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(23)   =  22.33  Prob > chi2 =  0.500 
Difference in Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
    GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(20)   =  19.55  Prob > chi2 =  0.486 
      Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   2.78  Prob > chi2 =  0.427 
Source: Author’s computations on SHIW data, Historical Archive, panel component, waves 1991 2006 
In the next section we discuss the estimation and the simulation mechanics of the intergenerational transfers 
sub module. 
 
5.  The intergenerational transfers sub-module 
 
This section describes the functioning of another important block of the Wealth module. Indeed, this part of 
the model proves to be of fundamental importance in modeling private wealth within a dynamic microsimulation 
framework which aims at explicitly accounting  in a probabilistic fashion  for inter generational links46 and, 
therefore, at evaluating the between generations/cohorts role of private wealth transmission contemporaneously 
to a demographic as well as an institutional transitions.  In fact, long since a broad consensus in the economic 
and  sociological  literature  has  been  reached  about  the  important  role  of  intergenerational  transfers  on  the 
process of household wealth accumulation and in the impact of social policies on the well being of individuals. 
For what concern the former issue several studies shows that inter vivos cash transfers and bequests involve a 
huge amount of resources every year which represents the most strait financial link across generations and may 
modify saving behaviour across them. Concerning the latter aspect, on a macro perspective the national saving 
rate depends strongly on how elderly – which typically hold a large share of total wealth   allocate their resources  
among consumption, inter vivos transfers to their children and bequest. On a micro perspective, intergenerational 
transfers may reduce inequality across generations but, in contrast, may enhance economic disparities within 
cohorts representing an important transmission channel of economic inequalities.  
How social security reforms will affect the well being of individuals and the effectiveness of government 
redistribution to reduce inequalities will depend on the determinants of intergenerational transfers (Altonji et al., 
1997;  Hurd  et  al.,  2007).  Assessing  the  underlying  reason  for  the  intergenerational  transmission  of  wealth, 
distinguishing in particular between the altruistic and the strategic motive, goes beyond the scope of the present 
work. However, the analysis of such phenomenon plays an important role in our study for at least two reasons:  
i) on the one hand, since the empirical evidence shows the size of the wealth transfers is not negligible 
(although some uncertainty surrounds the exact magnitude of it) and that they are very concentrated, assessing 
the main statistical determinants of such choices is important since they have a significant impact on the overall 
wealth distribution;  
                                                           
46 For instance, as far as we understand of SESIM III, in the Swedish MSM the transmission of private wealth is not 
explicitly modeled, that is a proper link across following generations is not allowed for, meaning that at an accumulation (for 
gifts and bequests) in a group in the sample does not correspond an equal and opposite de cumulation in another group. 
Rather, SESIM each period, estimates the probability of owning a given stock of a certain asset for the households that have 
a null amount of it, then it imputes an amount to the selected units and, in the following periods,  let it evolve, partly 
deterministically e partly stochastically, as a random walk. 27 
 
ii) on the other hand, intergenerational transfers may support or even substitute social security transfers, 
especially whenever the latter are going to play a decreasing role in the future, as it is expected in Italy as a 
consequence of recent social security reforms. The question is even more crucial if we bear in mind three main 
features of Italian demography and economy: the secular decline in fertility, which is more pronounced in 
comparison  with  other  European  countries,  the  high  saving  rate  of  the  elderly  and  the  mortgage  market 
imperfection which, determining important borrowing constraints for the young, would reduce even more their 
consumption capabilities as well as the decision and the possibility to purchase a house in the absence of 
substantial  private wealth transmission. 
In other words, we wonder what could be – in Italy   the likely evolution in the role of private transfers in the 
next decades wealth distribution, when cohorts which have been characterized by a higher saving rate and a 
lower number of  descendants, compared with previous generations, will grow up and extinguish.  
For this purposes, development in dynamic micro simulation represents a more and more powerful tool 
compared with other kind of methods since it provides a complete account of predicted transfers given and 
received  each  year  which  can  be  compared  with  actual  data,  incorporating  any demographic transition  and 
generating  the  future  path  of  characteristics  that  determine  choices.  Moreover,  it  would  accommodate 
differential saving rates and relevance of cohort and time effects by means of sensitivity analysis (Christelis, 
2008).  
A  precedent  of  the  use  of  micro  simulation  for  the  analysis  of  wealth  transfers  is  the  Wealth  Transfer 
Microsimulation Model (WTMM) developed by the Center on Wealth and Philanthropy of the Boston College 
which is focused and dedicated on the wealth transmission phenomenon, focusing however on inter vivos 
philanthropic giving and charitable bequests, while, as far as we know, the modeling of intra enlarged families 
wealth transmission in a “multitasking” dynamic population MSM is still very limited. 
Concerning the quantitative evaluation of such a phenomenon, available data for Italy are still narrow. The 
only two sources are the Bank of Italy Survey on Household Income and Wealth (SHIW, 1992 and 2002 waves) and 
the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE), which collects information on a representative 
sample of a cross country of populations for individual aged over 50. According to Cannari and D’Alessio (2007) 
which employ the former source, intergenerational transfers represent a significant share of Italian households 
net wealth: direct estimates referring to 2002 range from 30 to 55 percent, depending on the inclusion of the 
income stream produced by transferred assets. Moreover, transfers would be concentrated on the top of the 
distribution and therefore would represent an important factor in explaining wealth inequality persistence in 
Italy. 
Similar results have been found in works based on SHARE data. This survey, collects more rich and detailed 
information compared with SHIW on wealth (and time in the form of reciprocal care) intergenerational transfers 
and provides the possibility to carry out cross country comparisons. To this end, Albertini, Kohli e Vogel (2008) 
show that the share of Italian households making a financial transfer in a year is smaller compared with northern 
countries families. Nevertheless, the share of transferred wealth is higher compared with the European average. 
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5.1  SHARE data and sample selection 
 
We base our econometric analysis of inter vivos monetary transfers on SHARE a cross country, longitudinal 
survey  which  collects  economic  and socio demographic  information on  a  population  of  (mainly  European) 
individuals aged over 50. 
The sample includes “all individuals born in 1954 or earlier, speaking the official language of the country and 
not  living  abroad  or  in  an  institution  such  as  a  prison  during  the  duration  of  the  field  work,  and  their 
spouses/partners independent of age”47. The recall period is 12 months preceding the interview. The survey 
includes a rich set of information concerning this population subgroup such as physical and mental health, 
employment,  pensions,  wealth,  consumption,  incomes,  expectations  and  other  piece  of  information  on 
households standard of living. 
In particular, SHARE represents a precious source on “intergenerational exchange both in terms of money – 
financial transfers (or material gifts) – and social reciprocal support.  
To this purpose, our empirical analysis employs the release 2.2.0 of the first wave (surveyed in 2004) – 
composed of about 32,000 individuals whereof 3,100 Italians – in order to investigate the phenomenon of inter 
vivos monetary transfers towards children (and grandchildren) living out of the family of origin48. 
This micro data source has the peculiarity, unusual in other surveys, of collecting detailed information on 
respondents’ children living out of the family of origin and allows the reconstruction of a correspondence 
between parents and children characteristics (influencing transfers) and, like this, a donor recipient matching 
which is hardly obtainable by using other sources. Such an element is crucial when one wants to evaluate a 
phenomenon  which  stands  out  for  its  distributional  implications  and,  in  particular,  for  its  role  in  the 
intergenerational transmission of inequality. 
Moreover, SHARE is explicitly focused on detecting intergenerational relationships by means of specific 
modules collecting a set of targeted questions and cross checks which should curb under reporting and mis 
reporting phenomena with reference to monetary transfers49 compared to other sources – as SHIW – in which 
this aspect is surveyed non continuatively, less in detail and with a much longer recall period. 
The original sample includes both nuclear (i.e. composed of one or two married people (parents) plus children 
(if any)) and non nuclear (families in which more than one family unit live together) households. Consistently 
with the demographic hypotheses which ground CAPP_DYN, that is to simulate the evolution of the Italian 
population allowing for nuclear families only, we dropped the household with a non nuclear, composite structure 
by the econometric analysis.  
                                                           
47 For further information see: Klevmarken, N.A., Swensson, and Patrik Hesselius (2005) 
48 For couples, question on financial transfers and on social support received are addressed to only one member who is 
asked to answer for the couple, but if the two members declare they have separate finances , information on financial 
transfers is surveyed from each member individually. Such a survey design called for a complex building procedure of our 
dependent and explanatory variables. 
49 Missing values for financial wealth are filled in using multiple imputations as described in Christelis et al. In particular, by 
means of a Monte Carlo technique, missing values are replaced by five simulated versions. 29 
 
In  order  to  evaluate  the  determinants  of  transfers  we  further  restrict  the  sample  by  considering  only 
household with children living out of the family of origin. Such a selection reduces the sample size to 16,871 
households whereof 1,533 are Italian. Such a size does not allow to focus the analysis on Italian families only, but 
we will control for systematic differences from other countries by means of dummy variables. 
 
 
5.2  The econometric models 
 
The empirical analysis we carried out aims at estimating simplified econometric models of inter vivos financial 
transmission,  in  order  to  get  the  parameters  to  be  implemented  in  the  simulation  program,  within  the 
probabilistic part of the intergenerational transfers sub module. In fact, as we will discuss in paragraph 5.3 this 
block also manages bequests that, nevertheless, follow a mechanical logic, being residually determined. Indeed, 
this mortis causa component of wealth transmission is the final results of the dynamics of savings provided by the 
consumption  rule  coupled  with  the  probabilistic  decisions  of  inter  vivos  transmission  as  well  as  all  the 
demographic  and  incomes  processes  simulated  by  the  pre existing  modules  of  CAPP_DYN.  In  this  sense, 
bequests represent the closing process of the whole set of probabilistic and behaviuoral processes carried out by 
the other modules of CAPP_DYN. 
The methodology we adopt in the inter vivos estimates is based on a traditional two part approach (where the 
first equation estimates the probability and the second the amount) and, in order to control for possible selection 
biases, draws on the micro econometric literature of estimation using a control function. In fact, the basic 
assumption according to which the data we seek to analyze is a random sample from a population is not met if 
being observed in the data is the outcome of a choice by the unit of analysis (individuals or households). In our 
case, some households choose to make a transfers to a child or to a grandchild. For those who choose not to 
make a transfer, then their (transferring) behavior is not observed. It follows the data is selected and not a 
random sample. In other words, we are interested in the population average effect of some determinants on the 
amount  transferred  but  the  sub sample  of  observed  donors  (or  recipients)  could  not  represent  the  whole 
population. Therefore we will introduce a Heckman correction in the OLS estimation of the amount, whether it 
is needed. 
In SHARE, inter vivos financial transfers are defined as “gifts, financial or material support (other than food or 
shared house) of at least 250 euros from/to someone within or outside the household”. For our purposes we 
isolate transfers towards children or grandchildren living outside the respondent household. 
The practical needs in order to implement inter vivos giving and receiving processes in the current dynamic 
simulation structure of CAPP_DYN impose some constraints to the empirical analysis. In particular, on the one 
hand they ask for the exclusion of several statistical controls that would be informative in econometric terms (as 
well as on a theoretical perspective) but that the current version of CAPP_DYN cannot dynamically age. On the 
other, they make us consider the separate modeling of the two sides of the transfer (donor and recipient) as an 30 
 
appropriate strategy. Therefore, we also had to construct a child level dataset50 where the unit of analysis is the 
child’s family (which is more likely to be recipient), rather than his/her parents, by means of an “inversion” of 
the original dataset. In practice, we had to convert the original dataset  representative of a population of over 50 
individuals  from wide to long form, by keeping the household heads only, by using household ID as the logical 
observation by which to re organize the data and by choosing the variables that contain the numbers of the 
children who were selected by the program as the variables over which we carry out the reshape51. We end up 
with two datasets. The original one, that we call “potential donors” and the derived one, that we call “potential 
recipients”52. Then we estimate the two sides of the exchange separately on the two datasets using, however, 
some mutual characteristics (i.e. recipients characteristic in the donor equation and vice versa). 
In  other  terms,  the  two  sides  of  the  wealth  transmission  are  analyzed  independently  of  each  other. 
Nevertheless, the inclusion of characteristics of both observational units in the equations (especially, controlling 
for parents financial wealth in the recipient regression) allows to explain a quite similar share of the variance of 
the  dependent  variables  in  the  two  outcome  equations  (i.e.  transfers  given  and  received),  thus  providing 
predicted values characterized by a quite similar variability. This property, as we will better clarify in the next 
paragraph, will prove to be important in the simulation stage in order to avoid an excessive under estimation of 
the intergenerational transmission of inequality through an unrealistic within cohort redistributive effect of private 
wealth inter generational transfers.  
Finally, since we are interested in the simulation of transfers of a certain amount, we restrict the estimation to 
transfers which are above the floor of 1500 euros. 
Therefore for the donor model we construct two dependent variables each for each estimation step: 
a)   in the selection equation (discrete choice) we employ a binary variable which is equal to one if the 
interviewed household has made at least a transfer (from 1 to 3) towards children or grandchildren in the 12 
months preceding the interview, zero otherwise. 
b)  For the outcome equation the dependent is built as the natural logarithm of the transferred amount on 
donor financial wealth53 (gross of transfer) ratio. 
 
                                                           
50 To restrict the recipient estimation (besides the donor) on the original unit of observation (the over 50 population) would 
have been easier. Nevertheless, in this age group the inter vivos financial receiving is quantitatively less considerable, being 
such a group currently characterized by a marked net outflow.  On  the contrary, the  most significant inflows for  this 
subgroup are bequests. 
51 In fact, in the survey the questions about children are only asked for a maximum of four children. When there are more 
than four children, the CAPI program selects the four children following a set of given criteria. 
52 Of course the latter dataset, given its derived nature, contains just a limited number of information that is directly related 
to the new observational units (i.e. the children of the original observational units). Moreover, it may not satisfy all the 
requirements of a random sample of the population. In particular, it could show a typical hierarchical structure where the 
levels are 1.child, 2.household and 3.country which, whether not properly accounted for, could determine a residual cross 
correlation. A suitable methodology could consist of fitting multilevel models. At the stage of the research, given our 
practical needs, we neglect such a potential source of distortion, trusting it is not too strong. 
 
53 Financial wealth includes bank accounts, government and corporate bonds, stocks, mutual funds, individual retirement 
accounts, contractual savings for housing and life insurance policies. 31 
 
Table 3 
Descriptive statistics of donor dependent variables on the whole and on the Italian sample 
 
   whole sample  Italy 
   Obs  Mean  Sd  min  max  Obs  Mean  Sd  min  max 
Donor  16871  0.259  0.438  0  1  1533  0.216  0.412  0  1 
Amount  4371  6012  18492  250  421931  332  5775  13683  250  150000 
Tr/ 
fin_wealth 
ratio  4371  0.22  0.315  0.0001  1  332  0.359  0.39  0.0005  1 
Source: Author’s computation on SHARE data (2004) 
The  final  distribution  on  household  sample  of  potential  donors shows  that  25.9%  “European”,  over  50 
families, with at least a child living outside, has made at least a transfer towards children or grandchildren in 
2004.  For  Italy,  the  share  of  donor  households  is  slightly  lower  (21.6%).  This  evidence  is  far  above  the 
information which emerges from SHIW (2002) according to which households who declare making at least a gift 
over their whole life are about 5%, while those who declare receiving a transfer in the same year are 0.18% only. 
The average transferred amount on the entire sample is about 6000 euros and for Italy is 5775 euros. 
The average value of the transfer on financial wealth ratio (conditioned to a positive transfer) is about 0.22 on 
the overall sample and about 0.36 on the Italian sub sample. At first glance, it seems Italian households have a 
quite lower frequency of transfer compared to other countries but, when they do transfer, the relative amount is 
higher with respect to the net wealth of recipients. Moreover, we have to bear in mind that in Italy, and generally 
in  Mediterranean  countries,  children  use  to  exit  from  the  family  of  origin  later  than  their  European 
contemporaries.  Therefore,  part  of  the  (implicit)  intergenerational  transfer  in  Italy  could  pass  through  an 
extended cohabitation with parents. 
The set of explanatory variables of the donor model includes: 
-  polynomial in age of household head;  
-  gender;  
-  education: diploma, degree or postgraduate (ref.: lower secondary) 
-  household structure: single or married and living with the partner;  
-  employment status: in work, unemployed, retired;  
-  net wealth quintiles (gross of transfers, if any) computed by country  
explanatory variables of the recipient side in the donor models are: 
-  dummy equal to 1 if the aim of the transfer is the financial support for a child marriage or a grandchild 
birth (marr_or_birth);  
-  dummy equal to 1 whether at least a child is unemployed (ch_unemp). 
For the recipient model: 
a)  The dependent of the selection equation is a binary variable which is equal to one if the child household 
being observed received a transfer in the 12 months preceding the interview, zero otherwise. 32 
 
b)  In the outcome equation, the dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the transfer received (in 
level) 
Table 4 
Descriptive statistics of recipient dependent variables on the whole and on the Italian sample 
 
Whole sample  Italy 
  Obs  Mean  Sd  Min  Max  Obs  Mean  Sd  min  max 
Recipient  31835  0.1502  0.3572  0  1  2259  0.1217  0.3270  0  1 
Amount  4782  4015  13527  250  371931  275  4530  12555  250  150000 
Source: Author’s computation on SHARE data 
 
The final distribution on household sample of potential recipients shows that 15 percent of overall derived 
families receives at least a transfer in 2004 amounting, on average, to 4000 Euros. For the Italian subgroup the 
frequency is a bit lower (0.12) an the average amount is a bit higher (4500) than the overall sample. 
Among the covariates of the recipient model, besides a polynomial in age we use some occupational and 
household structure controls plus the existence of children (which in turn are grandchildren for the donors) and, 
as a cross explanatory variable, the (pre transfer) financial wealth of the family of origin. 
In the tables 5 and 6 we report estimated coefficients for the two separate models. For the donors model, the 
evidence reported in the descriptive statistics of a lower probability joint to a larger share of transferred wealth 
for Italian households is also confirmed in the regression coefficients; in fact, in the selection equation, estimated 
by means of a logit model, ITA dummy coefficient is negative and significant ( 0.27), while in the outcome 
equation is positive and significant, with an elasticity of 70 percent. 
The effect of age (positively concave and negatively convex in the selection and in the outcome equations, 
respectively) should be interpreted with caution as it is not feasible to disentangle cohort effects in a cross 
sectional analysis. 
 Belonging to higher net wealth quintiles still has a positive sign in the logit, but has a negative sign in the 
outcome equation. Therefore, better off households show a higher transfer probability but, as a share of their 
financial wealth, they transfer less compared to less richer families. Donor household head’s educational level has 
a positive impact on the probability while not on the intensity. Employed household heads show a higher 
transfer  probability  but  a  lower  ratio  (probably  due  to  a  greater  denominator).  Turning  to  the  recipients 
characteristics, the determinant role for parents giving of some specific events in the recipient life (such as 
unemployment,  marriage,  child  birth)  is  confirmed  and  increase  both  the  probability  to  be  donor  and  the 
amount. In particular, we use latter variable, i.e. wed_or_birth   that is strongly significant and very powerful 
(coefficient 3.2) in predicting the financial giving event   in the selection equation only, in order to satisfy the 
exclusion restriction for the Heckman correction. Such augmentation proves to be opportune in controlling for 
the selection bias, as (the inverse of the) Mills ratio coefficient is extremely significant and positive (.27). 33 
 
Turning to the recipient equations (table 6), due to the derived nature of the dataset, we can estimate just a 
model with a reduced number of covariates and controls and no valid exclusion restrictions. Therefore, we do 
not control for selectivity that however, in the case of recipients, is likely to be less severe than for donors. 
Moreover, the dependent variable in the outcome equation is the level amount of received transfer, rather than 
the ratio to financial wealth, information on children’s household wealth being not available in the data. 
In particular, the presence of a child in the recipient family (i.e. a grandchildren for the donor) as well as the 
status of divorced or single strongly increase the probability to receive a transfer (being .28 and .64 the estimated 
coefficients  of  the  first  and  the  other  covariates),  while  the  former  characteristic  negatively  influences  the 
amount, though with a low statistical significance. Moreover, households with a graduated head seem to enjoy a 
higher receiving probability than less educated people54. Italian recipients show both a higher average probability 
(.20) and a greater average amount (.24) compared to the other European homologues. This evidence seems at 
odds with the evidence of a lower giving probability in the table 5. Nevertheless Italian households tend to 
transfer more often to all of their children (if they have more than one) when they do that and have, on average, 
a slightly few number of children (2.04) compared to the overall sample (2.13) therefore, from the population of 
recipients point of view, this fact translates in a higher probability of taking a more generous gift. Finally, a 
powerful determinant of transfer receiving is, as expected, the financial wealth of the family of origin which 
shows .17 coefficient and 9 percent elasticity in the selection and in the amount equation, respectively. We will 
show in the next section how we impute the values of this variable for the households we cannot link to any 
potential donor in the simulated sample because the household of origin is not observable and will clarify why 
we decided to account for this determinant of the transfer receiving (at least, stochastically) in the dynamic 
simulation program, even if it is not always observable. 
 
                                                           
54 Children’ education is partially correlated with parents economic resources therefore it is a channel of transmission of 
inequality. 34 
 
Table 5:Two-step estimation for intergenerational giving with Heckman correction 
 
      Donor side             
Logit Probability 
of being Donor   b     Se  t  ci95    
Age  0.0807  ***  0.0243  3.3247  0.0331  0.1282 
age2   0.0007  ***  0.0002   3.6454   0.0010   0.0003 
in work  0.3522  ***  0.0520  6.7709  0.2502  0.4541 
Q3_wealth  0.4146  ***  0.0543  7.6407  0.3082  0.5209 
Q4_wealth  0.6046  ***  0.0531  11.3847  0.5005  0.7087 
Q5_wealth  0.6989  ***  0.0531  13.1703  0.5949  0.8029 
child_unemp  0.2835  ***  0.0625  4.5362  0.1610  0.4060 
wed_or_birth  3.2668  ***  0.1205  27.0990  3.0305  3.5030 
upper_secondary  0.5074  ***  0.0463  10.9505  0.4166  0.5982 
degree_or_more  0.7420  ***  0.0502  14.7720  0.6435  0.8404 
Ita   0.2737  ***  0.0747   3.6648   0.4201   0.1273 
_intercept   4.4368  ***  0.8158   5.4386   6.0358   2.8379 
OLS ln{Ratio }  b     se  t  ci95    
Age   0.7785  **  0.2404   3.2378   1.2498   0.3071 
age2  0.0113  **  0.0036  3.1508  0.0043  0.0183 
age3   0.0001  **  0.0000   3.0735   0.0001  0.0000 
in work   0.4384  ***  0.0866   5.0614   0.6081   0.2686 
Retired   0.2449  **  0.0849   2.8834   0.4114   0.0784 
Unemp   0.4619  **  0.1649   2.8011   0.7851   0.1386 
ch_unemp  0.3006  ***  0.0817  3.6810  0.1405  0.4606 
Q3_wealth   0.5422  ***  0.0752   7.2122   0.6896   0.3948 
Q4_wealth   0.8931  ***  0.0736   12.1293   1.0374   0.7487 
Q5_wealth   1.4278  ***  0.0733   19.4826   1.5715   1.2841 
Ita  0.7029  ***  0.0951  7.3954  0.5166  0.8893 
mills_ratio  0.2653  ***  0.0414  6.4036  0.1841  0.3465 
_intercept  15.5409  **  5.3305  2.9154  5.0904  25.9915 
Source: Author’s computations on SHARE data, wave 2004 
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Table 6: Two-step estimation for intergenerational receiving without Heckman correction 
      Recipient side             
Logit Probability 
of being 
Recipient  b     t  ci95       
log (af parents)  0.1690  ***  0.0061  27.9277  0.1572  0.1809 
Age   0.0883  ***  0.0105   8.4309   0.1089   0.0678 
age2  0.0007  ***  0.0001  5.1123  0.0004  0.0009 
Married  0.3004  **  0.1119  2.6837  0.0810  0.5198 
Single  0.6497  ***  0.1125  5.7755  0.4292  0.8702 
Divorced  0.6462  ***  0.1288  5.0152  0.3936  0.8987 
in work   0.2689  ***  0.0403   6.6680   0.3479   0.1898 
Degree  0.3421  ***  0.0414  8.2639  0.2610  0.4232 
Grandchildren  0.2863  ***  0.0442  6.4715  0.1996  0.3729 
Ita  0.1984  **  0.0709  2.7981  0.0594  0.3374 
_Intercept   1.3815  ***  0.2094   6.5968   1.7920   0.9710 
OLS ln{Amount}  b     se  t  ci95    
ln{af parents}  0.0892  ***  0.0079  11.3639  0.0738  0.1046 
Age  0.0253  *  0.0147  1.7236   0.0035  0.0540 
age2   0.0004  *  0.0002   1.8941   0.0007  0.0000 
Grandchildren   0.1051  *  0.0567   1.8541   0.2163  0.0061 
Married  0.1911  ***  0.0494  3.8684  0.0942  0.2880 
Ita  0.2481  **  0.0944  2.6275  0.0629  0.4333 
_Intercept  7.0280  ***  0.2699  26.0390  6.4987  7.5574 
 
Source: Author’s computations on SHARE data, wave 2004 
 
5.3  Implementation of the transfers sub-module in CAPP_DYN 
In this section we describe the structure of the intergenerational transfer sub module of CAPP_DYN. This 
module  includes  the  set  of  procedures  which  allow  the  transmission  of  financial  and  real  (only  in  bequest 
processes) wealth among the family units in every year of simulation. 
In the simulation program, as we mentioned in the previous paragraph, wealth transfers may occur inter vivos 
or mortis causa. The former involve redistribution of wealth from donor to recipient family units which are linked 
by ties of blood during their all life cycle. The latter occur when a household extinguishes in the model (because 
all of their member died), through the distribution of net wealth (whether positive) among heirs. 
In  the  current  release  of  the  model  we  assume  inter  vivos  transfer  decisions  depend  on  socio economic 
characteristics of the observational unit, according to the estimates reported in the regression tables showed in 
the  previous  section.  In  other  terms,  every  year  of  simulation,  first  the  model  within  the  original  blocks 
determines such characteristics then, conditional to these observables, wealth transfers are simulated. As already 
discussed, feedbacks from wealth decisions to demographic, occupational and pension choices are not allowed 
yet.  In practice, household wealth endowment of period t 1 is dynamically brought up to date in t, allowing for 
possible wealth transfers   given or received in – t, before the other Wealth module processes start to run. 36 
 
 Figure 10 shows a simplified structure of the sub module. The starting point is the identification of alive 
households in the current year. Among households with head aged over 50 and with a positive wealth in the 
previous period, the model selects those with the highest transfer probability. This selection follows a pseudo 
random lottery, that is, the model compute the deterministic prediction of the discrete choice model reported in 
table 5, upper panel. Such a conditional probability (score) coupled with a Monte Carlo process allows the 
selection  of  the  actual  donor  households  among  those  with  the  highest  score.  The  model  endogenously 
determine the donors share, depending on the interaction of the econometric model and the Monte Carlo 
stochastic ranking . The second step determines the transferred wealth as a share of household enlarged financial 
wealth, on the basis of the estimated coefficients reported in table 5, lower panel. 
 
Figure 10: Intergenerational transfers sub-module structure 
 
 
Once donor households have been identified and the wealth to be transferred has been determined, the model 
brings  up  to  date  the  stock  of  household  financial  assets.  The  down  spending  of  donors’  wealth  is 
deterministically simulated, by subtracting the amount transferred by the pre transfer held stocks. 
The following step starts from the identification of the potential recipients of a wealth transfer. The model 
deterministically predicts a conditional probability according to econometric model reported in table 6, upper 37 
 
panel. The received amount is determined by using the coefficients got by the regression of log levels reported in 
lower panel of the same table.  
In particular, the (log) value of parents’ financial assets for those family units the model cannot link to a 
potential donor in the sample in a period t is obtained as a draw from a normal distribution with mean and 
variance equal to the actual first and second moments of the financial wealth distribution among over 50 families 
in period t. This strategy issues from the empirical evidence that the current over 50s financial wealth distribution 
approximates a log normal distribution, as reported in figure 11. This procedure implicitly assumes the future 
distribution of financial wealth will change in its mean and variance only (not a really strong assumption) and 
that such a draw is independently distributed over time55 and across families.  
We  follow  this  approach  rather  than  simply  exclude  this  variable  from  the  set  of  recipient  equations 
regressors, in order to warrant a pretty good matching between the variances of given and received simulated 
transfers. On the opposite, the exclusion of such a covariate (which explains much of the selection/outcome 
equations) in the recipient equation would have implied a much lower variability in the predicted amount of the 
received transfers (inflows) compared to the variance in the predicted amount of the given transfers (outflows). 
This fact would have ended up to make the transfer sub module work as a progressive tax benefit module, with 
obvious distorting rebounds on the transmission of inequality among generations. In practice, we introduce an 
important explanatory factor in the recipient equations that, whenever unobservable, is substituted by a random 
component whose first two moments, however, are not fixed over the simulation period, but are time varying 
according to the distributional evolution of the enlarged financial wealth among over 50 households. 
Figure 11 
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Source: Author’s computation on SHARE data (2004) 
   
                                                           
55 This is a stronger, less realistic assumption. Nevertheless, just few households are selected for receiving an inter vivos 
transfer more that once or twice in a life cycle, so this implicit assumption proves to be quite innocuous in distributional 
terms. 38 
 
Next, the model verifies the consistency between the total (out and in)flows and, every year, imposes the 
following condition to hold: 
( )
1 1







= ∑ ∑        
 
Where J and K are the households which give (G) and receive (R) a transfer, respectively, while af is the 
amount of transferred financial wealth. Condition (1) ensures an accounting consistency in the process of inter 
vivos transmission. 
In case a family unit extinguishes due to the death of the last member, the model simulates the (proportional) 
transmission of the whole wealth endowment to the heirs. It is worth pointing out that it would be very difficult 
to allow for the whole family relationship in sample population. The most of the dynamic micro simulation 
models  developed  in  Northern  Europe,  United  States  and  Australia  consider  the  individual  as  the  unit  of 
analysis, explicitly admitting the serious technical difficulties in simulating the evolution of familiar links. Such a 
drawback is of great importance when the focus of the analysis is on the distribution of wealth. To this end, we 
try  to  account  for  the  main  family  relationships  in  order  to  define  the  heir  stall  of  bequests.  Currently 
CAPP_DYN allows to consider the relationships among individuals which, during the survey (2002) shared the 
same house plus those individuals who lived outside the family of origin at that time but whose existence was, 
however, reported by the survey respondents56. Therefore, we consider among potential heirs all the children, 
grandchildren and common law spouses in the initial population plus the children living outside (i.e. not included 
in the sample) plus children and grandchildren born during the simulation period. In this way we should account 
for the most part of the heir stall.  
Once the number of heir family units are defined, bequests are deterministically simulated with the stock of 
wealth being proportionally distributed among them in the form of financial wealth while the flows toward out 
of sample heirs is initially destroyed. Then, in order to ensure the accounting consistency of the wealth stocks in 
the economy the model imposes every year the following identity to hold: 
 
1 1
Res                    (2)
= =





nw nw  
 
Where J is the number of extinguishing family units in each year which pass on their wealth (G) mortis causa, K is 
the number of in sample heirs which receive a bequest (R), nw is the net wealth transferred amount (in the form 
of financial wealth) and Res is the residual amount consisting of the net wealth of households which extinguishes 
without heirs plus the wealth shares received by out of sample heirs.  
At  this  stage  we  decided  to  impute  such  a  residual  through  calibration,  where  Res  is  distributed  as  a 
proportion of net worth already held by the household, in order not to alter the sample wealth distribution. 
                                                           
56 For these individuals the assumption is they die after their parents with probability equal to 1. 39 
 
Appendix A: SHIW data 
As already mentioned, all estimates of the Wealth – except for the equations of the transfers sub module   are 
based on the Bank of Italy’s Survey of Households Income and Wealth (SHIW), the Italian official source for 
distributional analysis. The survey collects information on economic situation   income and wealth (since 1987)   
savings and consumption behaviour (since 1980)   and social features of a sample of families (sample size varying 
from 3000 families in the 1966 to 8000 since 1986) in the period 1977 200657.  
The sampling scheme is organized in two stages: firstly, municipalities are selected according to 51 strata; in a 
second step households are randomly selected within the stratum. 
The historical archive used for the analysis collects waves since 1977 (no micro data are available for earlier 
years)  and  provides  files  containing  income  and  wealth  adjusted  according  to  homogeneous  definitions 
(excluding  variables  which  were  not  collected  in  a  systematic  way)  both  at  household  and  individual  level; 
weights aligning socio demographic distributions with ISTAT population statistics and labour force survey (post 
stratification) are also provided for (Brandolini, 1999).  
The survey unit is the household, i.e. “group of individuals linked by ties of blood, marriage or affection, 
sharing the same dwelling and pooling all or part of their incomes” (Brandolini, 1999); however, as information 
are gathered at individual level (interest, dividends and financial assets being recorded at family level only), 
analyses on personal income are allowed as well.  
SHIW income is net of taxes and social security contributions, hence it does not provide any information on 
tax and redistribution issues. 
Since 1989, a panel section composed of households already interviewed in the previous wave is provided for. 
The panel size was 15% of the sample in the 1989 but increased over time to reach the 45% in the 1995. 
Moreover, since 1995 people leaving a family included in the panel and creating a new family were included 
(Brandolini, 1999). We exploited this component in our estimates of the consumption rule. 
Anyway, these datasets should be used with great caution for several reasons. Differential response rate among 
groups, under reporting and mis reporting (especially for capital income) are in fact likely to bias estimation 
based on this source. In particular, under reporting seems significantly widespread among self employed (nearly 
20% in 1987, according to Cannari and Violi’s (1995) estimates) and inversely correlated to household income 
and wealth, causing an underestimation of mean income and inequality58 (Cannari and D’Alessio, 1993).  
 In addition, a comparison with National Accounts data (through a grossing up procedure) shows a slight 
overestimation of wages while a severe underestimation for self employment income and net interest on financial 
assets is recorded (respectively by 50% and 65 70%), resulting in an underestimation of total income of about 
30% (32% when interest and dividends are included, Brandolini, 1999). 
Concerning wealth, analyses based on the comparison between micro and macro data showed the amounts 
recorded in the SHIW under estimate both real and financial components of wealth (Brandolini et al., 2004). In 
                                                           
57 Starting in 1966, the SHIW was conducted yearly up to 1987 (except for 1985) and every two years since then, the last 
wave being in 2006. The new wave 2008 is available from January 2010. 
58 Response rate seems declining sharply from 26% of poorest to 14% of richest (Cannari, D’Alessio, 1992). 40 
 
2002 the total financial assets estimates derived from the survey is about one third of the corresponding value 
from Financial Accounts (Bonci et al., 2005). 
To this end, concerning misreporting, no comparable data are available for real wealth in the official National 
Accounts, therefore we do not make any adjustment for the level of reported real wealth.  
Finally, concerning financial wealth, we employ the adjusted values provided by D’Aurizio et al. (2006)59 
which matched the 2002 SHIW wave with anonymous data from a sample survey of customers of the Unicredit 
group on the assets actually owned by the customers. By using advanced econometric techniques, this procedure 
determines  a  substantial  correction  for  private  bonds  and  mutual  funds,  particularly  significant  for  single 
household and increasing with age. We do not employ the adjusted data in the econometric stage (except for the 
estimation of the risk propensity, reported in appendix B), but we replace them in the initial population (SHIW 
2002) in order to simulate more realistic distributions. 
 
Figures 12: distribution of household net wealth (upper),  
financial wealth (bottom left) and house equity (bottom right) 
 
 
   
Source: Author’s computations on SHIW 2002, Euros 2002 
 
                                                           
59 We are grateful to Leandro D’Aurizio, Ivan Faiella, Stefano Iezzi and Andrea Neri for providing us with data adjusted for 
under reporting  resulting  from  their  work  “L’under reporting  della  ricchezza  finanziaria  nell’Indagine  sui  Bilanci  delle 
Famiglie Italiane”. 41 
 
Here above in figures 12  we show the distribution of net wealth (upper panel) financial wealth (bottom left) 
and  real  estate  (bottom  rignt)  in  the  initial  dataset  (SHIW  2002)  across  Italian  households,  emboding  the 
correction on financial assets we described above. As we can see, the 2002 distribution of net worth in Italy is 
pretty unequal and right skewed with a mean of 212,000 euros, a median of 133,000 and the Gini is equal to 0.56. 
Financial  assets  aggregate,  as  expected,  is  the  most  unequally  and  skewed  distributed  (Gini  is  0.63  with  a 
skewness of 11.58) and its mean value is about 58,000 euros. Finally, real estate (without corrections) is the most 
important wealth component with a mean of 162,000 euros and Gini of 0.59. 
In figure 13 we show the age profile60 of each wealth component in the initial dataset 2002, while in the 
following figure 14 the age profile of the risky and non risky components of financial assets as well as the share 
of household holding risky assets in 2002 
 
Figure 13: wealth component age profiles 
 
 
Source: Author’s computations on SHIW 2002, Nadaraya Watson nonparametric regression, Euros 2002 
                                                           
60 Given the cross sectional nature of this fit, age and cohort effects are confused. 42 
 
Figure 14: age profile of risky vs non-risky financial assets 
 




Appendix B: Heckman estimation of enlarged financial wealth allocation between risky and non 
risky assets 
 
Table 7: Two-step Heckman estimation for financial allocation 
 
Share of AF invested  
in risky assets (outcome)  B  se 
Age  0.0089  0.0023 
age2  0.0000  0.0000 
Public  0.0502  0.0141 
Q2_wealth   0.1224  0.0192 
Q3_ wealth   0.1179  0.0198 
Q4_ wealth   0.1704  0.0218 
Q5_ wealth   0.2712  0.0269 
South   0.1377  0.0177 
second_house  0.0328  0.0135 
Intercept  0.3641  0.0786 
Probability of holding  
Risky assets (selection)  B  Se 
Age  0.1364  0.0328 
age2   0.0020  0.0006 
age3  0.0000  0.0000 
Public  0.1379  0.0525 
Q2_wealth  0.3815  0.0505 
Q3_ wealth  0.4467  0.0501 
Q4_ wealth  0.5771  0.0508 
Q5_ wealth  0.8781  0.0585 
upper_secondary  0.4300  0.0397 
degree_or_more  0.4807  0.0654 
Nuclfam  0.1231  0.0333 
Center   0.1789  0.0411 
South   0.7548  0.0364 
second_house  0.1334  0.0581 
Intercept   3.4097  0.5876 
Mills       
Lambda  0.0494  0.0337 
Rho  0.1875    
Sigma  0.2634    
mu_res  0.0000    
sd_res  0.2608    
Source: Author’s computations on SHIW data, Historical Archive, wave 2002 
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Appendix C: House property decisions 
Table 8: logit estimation for buying first house (top left) second houses (top right) and  




B  se 
 
Buy  
2nd  houses 
Probability 
B  Se 
Q2_age   0.8422  0.1459    Q7_age  0.4558  0.2942 
Q3_age   1.1084  0.1459    Q4_income  0.2132  0.3779 
Q4_age   1.6072  0.1589    Q5_income  0.9777  0.3021 
Q5_age   1.8556  0.1627    Q5_wealth  1.9461  0.3100 
Q6_age   1.8798  0.1608    Intercept  6.9155  0.2992 
Q7_age   2.2899  0.1839    sd_residual  1.0302    
Q8_age   2.6652  0.2303         




b  Se 
Q10_age   3.1097  0.3068    q_eta7  0.8393  0.1896 
Q3_income  0.3533  0.1302    q_eta8  0.4566  0.2281 
Q4_income  0.3284  0.1263    Q2_wealth  0.7548  0.3510 
Q5_income  0.5198  0.1239    Q3_ wealth  0.7777  0.3671 
Intercept   2.6902  0.1240    Q4_ wealth  1.3940  0.3349 
sd_residual  0.5508       Q5_ wealth  1.9592  0.3247 
       
upper_secondary  0.6642  0.1609 
       
degree_or_more  0.9349  0.1972 
        Intercept  6.9076  0.2952 
  Source: Author’s computations on SHIW data, Historical Archive, waves 1991 2006 
Table 9: OLS estimation for 1st house (left) and 2nd houses (right) values as net worth ratios 
1st  house 
value ratio  B  Se   
2nd  houses 
value ratio  b  Se 
Age   0.0275  0.0021    Age   0.0459  0.0081 
age2  0.0002  0.0000    age2  0.0003  0.0001 
Q3_income   0.0342  0.0105    Q4_income   0.0445  0.0330 
Q4_income   0.0595  0.0109    Q5_income   0.1657  0.0314 
Q5_income   0.1821  0.0128    Center  0.0801  0.0274 
Center  0.0422  0.0091    upper_secondary   0.0948  0.0284 
upper_secondary   0.0619  0.0097    degree_or_more   0.1697  0.0336 
degree_or_more   0.1022  0.0160    self employed   0.3592  0.0332 
self employed   0.3865  0.0148    widowed  0.1313  0.0402 
Widowed  0.0799  0.0106    tau1993   0.1616  0.0420 
tau1993   0.0686  0.0170    tau1995   0.0622  0.0398 
tau1995   0.0670  0.0142    tau1998   0.0644  0.0442 
tau1998   0.0442  0.0154    tau2000   0.0285  0.0430 
tau2000   0.0223  0.0140    tau2004  0.0647  0.0440 
tau2004  0.0390  0.0136    tau2006  0.0640  0.0491 
tau2006  0.0547  0.0131    Intercept  0.4230  0.2294 
Intercept  0.7966  0.0618         
Source: Author’s computations on SHIW data, Historical Archive, waves 1991 2006 45 
 
 
Appendix D: Estimations for projecting life cycle earnings which are a component of lifetime 
Human Resources 
 
Table 10: OLS61 estimation for dynamic (left panel) and GLS for static (right panel)  
projection of earnings equations 
dynamic  B  se    static  B  Se 
earnings_l  0.3484  0.0049    Age  0.1822  0.0131 
Age  0.0146  0.0019    age2   0.0033  0.0003 
age2   0.0002  0.0000    age3  0.0000  0.0000 
Public  0.0181  0.0063    Nperc   0.0267  0.0062 
N_perc   0.0262  0.0030    age_upsec  0.0008  0.0005 
Partime   0.3413  0.0118    age_degree  0.0054  0.0009 
age_center   0.0003  0.0002    tau1991  0.0041  0.0115 
age_south   0.0028  0.0001    tau1993   0.1003  0.0117 
age_fem   0.0034  0.0001    tau1995   0.1257  0.0112 
age_empl  0.0091  0.0008    tau1998   0.0842  0.0100 
age_self  0.0092  0.0008    tau2000   0.0190  0.0096 
age_upsec  0.0036  0.0001    tau2004  0.0518  0.0114 
age_degree  0.0073  0.0002    tau2006  0.0930  0.0139 
tau1991  0.0101  0.0106    Intercept  6.4457  0.1805 
tau1993   0.0105  0.0096    sd_u  0.5540    
tau1995   0.0458  0.0094         
tau1998   0.0028  0.0104         
tau2000  0.0059  0.0093         
tau2004  0.0220  0.0094         
tau2006  0.0221  0.0093         
Intercept  5.7400  0.0546         
Source: Author’s computations on SHIW data, Historical Archive, panel component, waves 1989 2006 
 
                                                           
61 OLS estimator is upward biased in estimating the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable (a GMM estimator would 
provide us a biannual income persistence of .137). Indeed, we employ this estimated persistence from a biannual panel as a 
parameter for the yearly dynamic simulation in order to give more importance to the current labor income in projecting 
expectations about future labor income. Given the frequency of our estimated dataset, which is different from the frequency 
of the expected earnings projection, we could simply neglect the role of past earnings in the projection of future expected 
earnings stream. Nevertheless we think we would have lost an important piece of information, therefore we decided to 
adopt this “second best” solution.  46 
 
Appendix E: The taxation sub module 
 
This part of the model uses all the available information (among the variables which are simulated in the 
model) in order to reproduce as much completely as possible the personal income taxation structure (IRPEF) at 
year 2007. The main processes of this module are: 
1.  Identification of individuals falling in the no tax area; 
2.  computation of basic tax deductions; 
3.  computation of gross tax according to the brackets progressive structure being in law; 
4.  computation of tax allowances for pensioners under 75; 
5.  computation of tax allowances for pensioners over 75; 
6.  computation of tax allowances for self employed; 
7.  computation of tax allowances for dependent spouse; 
8.  computation of tax allowances for dependent children. 
The output of this module are the individual after tax incomes which, once aggregated over the household, 
enter as explanatory into the consumption function.  
In practice, the taxation sub module is propedeutic and preliminary to the Wealth module programs. It takes 
all the gross labour and pension incomes provided by the pre existing blocks of CAPP_DYN and process them 
recursively from 2003 to 2050 (last year of simulation).  
Therefore, summarizing, in every single loop the module computes the individual tax base and evaluates  
deductions and allowances for family burdens or for particular occupational status or age. Then, the module 
computes the gross income tax by applying a marginal tax rate of 23% up to 15,000 Euros, 27% between 15,000 
and 28,000 Euros, 38% between 28,000 and 55,000 Euros, 41% between 55,000 and 75,000 and 43% over 
75,000  Euros.  Finally,  after  deducting  all  base  deductions  and  the  allowances  above  reported,  the  module 
evaluates the net personal income tax. 
We than assume this tax schedules to remain stable all over the simulation period and account for real growth 
by increasing all the bracket thresholds by the growth in productivity that is used for the alignment of the 
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